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Economic use of time (efficiency) and democracy are common features in many 
modern western societies. However, a strong egalitarian democracy requires equal 
participation in the social construction of meaning, reason and ultimately knowledge. 
That is, the intersubjectivity that is formed through communication and social 
interaction is the base of a democratic society. The pursuit of efficiency and status 
often stand in opposition to broad social interaction and human communication and 
therefore our ability to build common understanding and reason. That is, the temporal 
anxiety (the need for constant quantifialble gratification), that is strongly connected to 
the modern notion of individualism, negatively affects the creation of social bonds. 
The modern western society is therefore characterized by a quantifiable mass of 




No Time for Reason: 
Deliberation, Status, and Democracy in the Modern Western Society  
 
Democracy is denied by neither armies nor powerful figures, but in the 
moment-to-moment.           
Stanley Deetz, 1992, p. 351 
 
With time we create order and shape the kind of world we live in. Yet we 
take our time values for granted, never stopping to consider the critical 
role they play in defining the social order. Every culture has its own unique 
set of temporal fingerprints. To know a people is to know the time values 
they live by.  
Jeremy Rifkin, 1987, p.1 
 
Introduction 
Time is money is a common perception in a modern western culture influenced 
by the economic exchange theory; every minute used for a specific activity has an 
alternative value. I can play with my daughter for an hour and make $0 or I can 
spend the same hour working and make $15. It is then up to me to determine 
whether the hour with my daughter is worth $15 or not: what we do with our time 
reflects how we value different activities.1
Political activity takes time and could therefore be measured in monetary units. 
How much money can I make deliberating political issues with my fellow 
citizens? In most cases nothing, unless I have the ability to influence political 
decisions in a way that benefits my narrow self-interest. I could, of course, really 
                                                 
1 Sleep would, according to this perspective, be one of the most expensive 
activities. We generally sleep 5-8 hours a night which, according to the above 
example, would cost $75-120.  
1 
 
enjoy a two-hour discussion about the American health-care system and “pay” the 
$30 exchange-value rather than spending the two hours at work.  
The notion that time is money is ultimately a reflection of our values and 
definitions, the priorities we make as individuals and as a society. The notion that 
time is money is not an absolute fact but rather a cultural representation. A culture 
helps people make sense of what happens around them, it guides our perceptions. 
Thomas Kuhn (1996) argued that failures in integrating key assumptions will 
eventually bring about enough contradiction to force a paradigm shift. Kuhn’s 
idea primarily relates to the natural sciences but it is not hard to see how 
competing values in the creed holding a society together could create similar 
results. It is difficult for a culture to move forward when the tension between two 
competing assumptions creates constant dissonance and conflict.   
Many modern scientists treat “science” as absolute; as if we know exactly how 
things work. This kind of assumption is not new: Leonardo de Vinci, Galileo, 
Newton, and Einstein have all effectively disproved some common assumptions 
regarding the world around us. Jean Gebser (1985) claims that the mental 
structure guiding modern western societies is deficient in the sense that we 
generally place ourselves outside the environment surrounding us. 
The authentic relation to psyche, the mental, is perverted into its opposite, 
to the disadvantage of the ego that has become blind through isolation. In 
such an instance, man has become isolated and his basic ties have been cut; 
the moderating, measuring bond, of menis and menos is severed. . . . The 
gates to the “demonic forces” have been opened; nothing exists out of 
itself, everything follows upon something else, everything has become a 
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consequence. We may well ask: a consequence leading to what? (Gebser, 
1985, p. 97) 
 
More specifically, the modern western culture, with its roots in 15th century 
Italy, learned early on how to master space but we are still struggling with the 
concept of time (Gebser, 1985). Some scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu (1977) 
claim that perceptions of time are social conceptions that grow out of the 
communication taking place in social interaction. Others, Jeremy Rifkin for 
instance, claim that we have stopped perceiving time for what it is, “embedded in 
natural events”, and instead perceive it as an “external symbol, a quantified 
abstraction.” Rifkin continues:  
We have come to see how things fit together by separating ourselves from 
nature’s biological clocks. . . We gained perspective, and in the process we 
lost touch with the ground of our temporal being. Our knowledge has been 
our alienation. Our increased understanding of nature has been 
accomplished by a self-imposed exile from biological time.  (Rifkin, 1987, 
p. 192) 
    
This essay describes how modern society has failed to integrate an inclusive 
and active democracy with our perception of time and status.2 That is, there is a 
strong cultural preference for democracy but we have in many ways failed to 
integrate this normative idea with the dominant cultural attitudes and practices 
concerning time. The failed integration of democracy with time and status in 
western culture has created a growing division between those claiming that 
fundamental democratic ideals are neglected and those claiming that our society is 
wasting important productive time. This division was especially visible in the 
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2000 and 2004 elections when some citizens claimed that references to time 
undermined the democratic creed that the U.S. was built upon.     
Different solutions have been presented in this struggle with time. Jeremy 
Rifkin argues that we need to exert power over time; that we should “resacralize 
life” by “resacralizing time”. He also claims that we may need to revalue the time 
we use to socialize and accept “the inherent pace, tempo, and duration of the 
natural world” (Rifkin, 1987, p. 4). Gebser (1985) claims that the fourth 
dimension, currently missing in our culture, is time-freedom: liberation from all 
time-forms3 where “everything becomes present, concrete, and thus integrable 
present” (p. 356). Gebser claims that the modern western temporal anxiety 
ultimately is a political issue: references to time-limits, for example in the 
aftermath of the 2000 Presidential election, are used to suppress democratic 
processes. That is, time in itself has no agency; it is instead our relationship to 
time that has important political consequences. Robert Levine proposes that we 
need to get out of the current temporal ghetto and apply a multitemporality in 
which everything does not have to follow the same pace.  
Many situations are best met by a temporal approach requiring a rapid pace 
of life: speed, attention to the clock, a future orientation, the ability to value 
time as money. Other domains in life – rest leisure, the incubation of ideas, 
social relationships – are more adequately met with a relaxed attitude 
towards time. (Levine, 1997, p. 219) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Status is, as described later in this essay, ultimately an extension of time.  
3 Gebser argues that we need to be able to include all previous time-forms in our 




A strong and inclusive democracy requires social interaction as well as 
deliberation. Both are time-consuming activities. Democracy also requires that we 
treat time as relative rather than absolute and that time is dependent on democratic 
activities and not the other way around. In other words, democracy does not 
function well when we constantly try to limit and plan our use of time. However, 
the primary purpose of this essay is not to present a specific solution to how to 
best integrate a temporal perspective with our democratic ideals. This dissertation 
instead describes the problems we face when we try to combine our democratic 
ideals with our modern western perspective of time. In other words, just because 
there are problems in a system does not mean that better alternatives automatically 
exist. However, it is important to examine all aspects of a culture and apply 
different perspectives in order to have the opportunity to identify better 
alternatives. The perspectives presented in this dissertation are not based on 
systematic empirical research. The method used in this dissertation is instead a 
‘philosophical analysis’; a “process of breaking a concept down into more simple 
parts, so that its logical structure is displayed” (Blackburn 1996, 14). That is, I 
attempt to break down the logical structure of common concepts in the modern 
western society. The content in this dissertation is therefore purposely not 
restrained to the expectations of one single field since I am attempting to 
reconstruct rather then support common assumptions. Ultimately I am working 
under the assumption that democracy ought to be studied beyond the focus of 
single individuals and instead focus on the bonds between the citizens. Democracy 
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in the modern western mass society can never be limited to the few people who 
are able to actively take part in central political decisions – we have to recognize 
that a large-scale society must find different venues for democratic practices. This 
perspective therefore breaks with the general strictly individualistic paradigm 
within Political science and Communication in favor of a perspective where 
democracy is based on connections and communication rather than isolated 
individuals. 
The literature chosen for this analysis is frequently citied in discussions over 
social bonds and its relationship with democracy. This is therefore not an 
extensive description of all the literature on social bonds and communal 
interaction – it is instead representing the perspectives presented in the current 
academic debate over civic engagement and social bonds. A large amount of older 
but yet interesting literature on the same area in many ways are therefore missing. 
For example, Soren Kierkegaard wrote about the faith in the “absent” modern 
god and George Campbell wrote about trust and faith 150 years before James 
Coleman and Robert Putnam “reintroduced” the same basic ideas. However, Kant, 
Cicero and even Aristotle had even long before that discussed the same issues.  
Robert Dahl (2001) defines democracy ideally as a “political system designed 
for citizens of a state who are willing to treat one another, for political purposes, 
as political equals” (p. 135). The key question is how we define political equals: 
is it only referring to an equal status on Election Day and in formal political 
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institutions? Dahl argues that democracy cannot be limited to only institutional 
arrangements: 
The end of a democratic country cannot depend on its constitutional 
systems for the preservation of its liberties. It can depend only on the 
beliefs and cultures shared by its political, legal, and cultural elites and by 
the citizens to whom these elites are responsive. (Dahl, 2001, p. 99) 
   
This essay advances a thesis that shares Dahl’s concern for a healthy political 
culture. However, I disagree with Dahl’s focus on the societal elite because 
political power is strongly related to the ability to define concepts, reason, and 
ultimately the way people perceive the world. Political equality needs to be 
extended to the social interactions taking place in the public sphere. Democracy 
requires that all citizens have a voice in the process of defining concepts, 
categories, reason, and ultimately the truth.  
This interactional approach to democracy breaks with the assumption that 
official political institutions, the Presidency for example, are the most important 
part of the democratic process. Some political science literature, represented for 
example by Almond and Verba (1963), Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), and 
Putnam (1993 & 2000), instead focuses on the qualities and attitudes of the 
general public and the way that citizens interact. Chapter 2 of this essay reviews 
and discusses literature on democracy from this perspective. The focus is on how 
citizens relate to each other and their ability to work towards common goals based 
on common interests.  
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Michel Foucault (1980) describes how power and knowledge only exist in 
social relations. From that perspective, democracy is an issue of knowledge and 
more specifically the ability to define what is considered to be important 
knowledge. The process of reasoning depends on the utilization of certain 
knowledge – of what citizens define as relevant and irrelevant knowledge. Those 
capable of defining what is considered to be relevant knowledge therefore possess 
power in the reasoning process. A democratic society is, from that perspective, a 
society where all citizens are part of the process of defining knowledge and 
ultimately what is considered reason and truth. This process takes place in the 
daily social interaction between citizens. Their ability to create understanding 
through communication affects their ability to reach and work towards common 
solutions. The social interaction process therefore has to be inclusive since an 
exclusive process, where only some citizens participate, creates a reason and 
understanding that is identified by only a few and therefore is undemocratic in 
nature.     
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action connects democracy with 
communication and deliberation. He argues that democracy has to start with the 
social interactions taking place between citizens. Our ability to reach common 
reason based on common understanding is the base of all democratic activity. 
Habermas therefore perceives communication to be a tool to build understanding 
rather than to achieve persuasion; a communication that integrates citizens rather 
than segregate political winners from political losers.  
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 An effective democracy had to be based on active support for the common 
norms and ideals that guide citizens’ behavior; what Robert Coleman (1988) and 
later Robert Putnam (1993) refer to as social capital. Chapter 3 therefore connects 
Putnam’s empirical research and ideas on social capital with Habermas’ theory of 
Communicative Action. Putnam argues that the quality of a political culture is 
determined by the social capital in society and that this extends to the everyday 
interaction in communities. Social norms that rise out of an active public sphere 
are more democratic and effective than laws that are forced upon citizens by the 
political elite.   
There are many aspects of the modern western culture that impact our civic 
engagement and social bonds. Time is, according to Gebser (1985), the most 
important feature of the modern western society. Gebser describes how the rise of 
individualism in the 15th century was tied to a quantification of time. Counting 
became especially important when currency arrived in communities and people 
were able to “count” their own gratification. Money made it possible to receive 
instant gratification instead of waiting for the gratification in heaven after death. 
The ability to receive quantifiable pre-death gratification made every minute 
important – suddenly an individual could get more gratification through working 
even more. Gebser (1985) calls this temporal anxiety: the feeling that it is always 
possible to squeeze more out of every minute of your life. Individualism had 
prevailed and in the middle of it were the quantifiable notions of money and 
especially time.        
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The pursuit of efficiency in modern western society stands in conflict with an 
inclusive democracy based on communication and broad societal interaction. 
Chapter 4 discusses temporal obstacles to an inclusive communicative democracy. 
An obvious question is whether citizens are willing to take their time and discuss 
political matters on a daily basis. However, the major challenge to an inclusive 
democracy is the constant pursuit of “saving time” in different social interactive 
situations. Rules, regulations, and practices in the modern society are 
systematically set up in a way in which everything is predetermined and there is 
no need for any communication that allows for any common reason and 
understanding. In other words, the temporal anxiety in the modern society, steer 
us towards less social interaction where there is less opportunity to find the 
common understanding and reason necessary for a strong and inclusive 
democracy.  
Traditions and status are temporal extensions. Traditions obviously relate to the 
past while status is an attempt to extend former accomplishments to the present 
and the future. They are perceived to be symbols of legitimacy and therefore tend 
to reduce the “need” for deliberation, which have clear democratic implications. 
Chapter 4 therefore extends the analysis of time and democracy to include 
historical references, traditions, and status. 
The concluding chapter extends the issue of communication and social 
interaction in society beyond the direct issue of political democracy. What 
happens to a society where we don’t have to communicate and interact? Are we 
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decreasing our ability to understand each other? Is a society with less 
communication and interaction necessarily a more efficient society?  
 
Democracy, Involvement, and Power 
If citizens are unable to enjoy the conditions of ‘effective participation’ and 
‘enlightened understanding’, then it is unlikely that the marginalization of 
large categories of citizens in the democratic process will ever be 
overcome, nor that the vicious circles of limited or non-participation will 
be broken. If the ‘final control’ of the ‘political agenda’ is out of the hands 
of the citizens, then ‘rule by the people’ will exist largely in name only. 
David Held, 1987, p. 278       
 
Democracy is generally defined as rule by the people, which effectively means 
that the “people” should posses power over the political process. It is hard to see 
how this would be possible if the “people” were not actively involved in the 
political process. The “people” could theoretically chose to leave the everyday 
practice in the political process in the hands of a societal elite but that would 
effectively mean that the “people” also leave the political power in the hands of 
the same societal elite. That kind of system looks more like an oligarchy or 
technocracy where a few elevated citizens decide upon all major definitions and 
set the political agenda.  
A broad, inclusive, and strong public sphere is therefore a requirement for the 
implementation of rule by the people. Broad political involvement has turned out 
to be a major struggle in many western democracies. This chapter presents a 
perspective where the focus is on social interaction rather than large public 
institutions – where political involvement includes more than just the participation 
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in direct electoral activities. However, this chapter starts where contemporary 
discussions regarding political involvement often start: with a focus on education 
and rational choices.  
Plenty of attention has been given to low levels of civic engagement in America 
and especially the low voter-turnout in the last 30 years. The fact that only about 
50% of eligible voters vote in Presidential elections4 (and often even fewer in 
other elections) raises concerns regarding the strength of one of the oldest and 
largest modern democracies in the world. Even more concerning is the low level 
of political participation among young citizens5 (ages 18-24); the group of people 
that theoretically should be most affected by important political issues like the 
future of social security, the war in Iraq, and environmental issues.  
A recent report completed by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the 
Center on Congress at Indiana University, and the Center for Civic Education 
states that young people “do not understand the ideals of citizenship, they are 
disengaged from the political process, they lack the knowledge necessary for 
effective self-government, and their appreciation and support of American 
democracy is limited”(Kurtz et al, 2003). The report suggests that more 
mandatory civics and government classes focusing on the structure and mechanics 
of political institutions could help solve this problem.  
                                                 
4 59.6 percent of eligible voters voted in the 2004 presidential election, which is 




Deliberative democracy scholars, like James Bohman (1997) and Joshua Cohen 
(1986), apply a different perspective to the evaluation of the modern democracy. 
They instead focus on the deliberation taking place ahead of the formal decisions 
– from the quantity of people participating to the quality of the participation and 
the attitudes that citizens bring to the political process. Some scholars claim that 
American citizens are socialized to apply a passive “watch-dog” role where they 
do not need to be active citizens, only “potentially active citizens” who interfere 
when things get out of control (Almond & Verba, 1963; Conover & Searing, 
2000). A deliberative democracy, on the other hand, is assumed to create rational 
and therefore better political decisions as well as create a more autonomous public 
sphere. Citizens are expected to actively participate in political deliberation and 
comprehend the importance and reasoning behind each decision and thus receive a 
greater interest in the political governing process. 
An important question is whether the U.S. public is capable of participating on 
the levels required for a strong6 deliberative democracy. Robert Putnam relates 
this question to a wide range of social scientists (for example Ferdinand Tönnies, 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 32.4 percent of citizens ages 18-25 voted in the 1996 presidential election. 
(Source: www.fairvote.org)  
6 Benjamin Barber (1984) uses the terms strong and weak democracy when 
describing the difference between a democracy in which citizens only participate 
out of their own narrow self-interest (weak democracy) and a democracy in which 
citizens recognize that they have the power to govern themselves with common 
interests. A representative democracy is therefore always weak according to 
Barber since it starts with the assumption that a few politicians know what is best 
for all other citizens; it is a system in which citizens loose their political 
autonomy.    
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Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel) arguing that “the decay of community bonds is 
inevitable in modernizing societies and that institutions must be created to fill the 
void” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p.14). That is, modern, primarily urban, societies 
generally lack the bonds that come with extensive human interaction; citizens are 
less united and therefore create a weaker public sphere.  
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) summarize their research on voluntary 
civic activity in American politics by stating that “the public’s voice is often loud, 
sometimes clear, but rarely equal” (p. 509). The relationships between political 
participation and age, income, and educational levels (all statistically positive) are 
well documented. Anglo Americans generally participate more than African 
Americans but the relationship is the opposite if one controls for economic factors 
(Verba & Nie, 1972). Women voted in lower numbers than men until the 1970’s 
but this trend was reversed starting with the 1980 election (Rosenstone & Hansen, 
1993). Research also suggests that citizens that are settled geographically 
(controlling for voter registration) and socially are more likely to participate in the 
political process as are people attending a church on a regular basis (Wolfing & 
Rosenstone, 1980; Shearer, Morris & Doppelt, 1998; & Watters, 1997).  
The mechanisms behind the above relationships are not always as clear. Some 
scholars focus on educational aspects – arguing that education creates interest and 
ultimately participation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1989). However, Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik-Barry (1996) argue that the increasing general educational levels in the 
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U.S. during the last 50 years have not been followed by an increase in the political 
participation levels.  
Rational choice scholars like Anthony Downs (1957) explain voting behavior 
according to a cost-benefit analysis. The government, as represented by 
politicians, tries to maximize the political support just like consumers and 
producers in the market economy try to maximize their gains through the 
application of exchange-theory. 
It [government] carries out those acts of spending which gain the most 
votes by means of those acts of financing which lose the fewest votes. In 
other words, expenditures are increased until the vote-gain of the marginal 
dollar spent equals the vote-loss of the marginal dollar financed (p. 52). 
  
Voters from the same perspective would vote for a candidate if their perceived 
rewards from voting were higher than the costs of voting.7 Rational choice 
theories applied to voting and political participation therefore end up with a ratio 
between two important variables in the modern western society: status (material 
benefits allow us to increase our relative status in society) and time. The cost of 
voting is primarily related to the time it takes to gather political information as 
well as the time it takes to physically vote. The direct material benefits of voting 
are on the other hand generally very limited considering the minimum impact the 
single average vote has on an election. The investment in time and payback in 
                                                 
7 Thomas Frank (2004) effectively (and humorously) disproves the notion that 
citizens make “rational” choices based on their material interests in What’s the 
Matter With Kansas? Frank claims that many voters in Kansas, as well as many 
other states, vote against their own material interest when voting Republican. 
Values and emotional connections drive voting behavior according to Frank.     
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material benefits do not come close to the same ratio as it does for most 
professional occupations and it therefore seems very irrational for most people to 
vote. For example, voters in Cleveland had to wait up to 10 hours in line in order 
to cast a vote in the 2004 Presidential election and all they received in exchange 
was a sticker stating that they had voted. The benefits of voting increase if one 
considers the emotional benefits from conforming to the cultural norm stipulating 
a duty to vote; people regard themselves as good citizens if they vote.  
However, the same cost/benefit ratio increases drastically if one expands the 
notion of political participation to financial contributions, volunteering on 
political campaigns, and contacting political representatives. But this is only the 
case for the citizens possessing the right societal status as for example determined 
by educational practices:  
The number of good seats is fixed. Rather, education can change only the 
composition of the population that is at or near the top of the rank. In the 
zero-sum game of political engagement, gains in proximity to the social 
and political center of society by one individual or group means a 
necessary loss of access to another.  
Education, however, does not create inequality. Inequality of political 
access is inherent in the competition for what is invariably a scarce 
resource.” (Nie et al, 1996, p. 188) 
   
People therefore pursue an education for a simple reason: 
Individual citizens attempt to attain as much education as they can [rather 
than civic values] because they desire more challenging and prestigious 
careers, greater wealth, more desirable mates, socially advantaged 
organizational positions, and perhaps even greater political influence. 
Attaining more education than those with whom the individual competes is 
the most effective way to attain the greatest amount of these scarce goods. 




In other words, education is from that perspective not a part of the process of 
cultivating democratic values and broader political involvement – it is a tool for 
the enhancement of social status.   
Verba et al. (1995) identify education as the key factor in developing political 
participation skills because it is “training workers, preparing citizens, and 
transmitting social class around generations. And in all three capacities – not only 
in transmitting social class – educational differences beget participatory 
inequalities” (p. 514). Political participation is an individual investment; it is an 
activity closely connected to social reproduction where economically advantaged 
citizens invest time and money in politics to keep their economic advantages, 
which allows them (and their children) to invest time and money in future political 
campaigns.  
Murrer and Sawhill (1998) provide empirical support for this theory: the 
economic and social mobilities are decreasing in the U.S. and the educational 
process is an important reason for this. In other words, a better-educated citizenry 
would probably have a lot of positive societal effects and some of them may 
involve the political sphere, but the educational process, as it is structured today, 
does not seem to foster more political involvement among large groups of 
citizens. Education is instead generally regarded as a tool for status enhancement 
and therefore effectively separates rather connects citizens – it helps appointing 
the citizens whom receive exclusive access to the political process. The rest of the 
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chapter is instead focusing on the democratic aspects of the creation of communal 
definitions and values.  
The Importance and Complexity of Definitions and Values    
Verba et al. (1995) rate financial contributions to political campaigns as the 
most influential yet least equal form of political participation. The negative impact 
of financial contributions to the political process has been a major focus in the 
debate over political cynicism during the last 10-15 years. It is commonly argued 
that the impact of financial contributions to politicians and political parties has 
undermined the public’s confidence and willingness to take part in the political 
process. The McCain-Feingold bill was an attempt to solve some of these 
problems. Yet, few of the politicians and political analysts in Washington believed 
that the McCain-Feingold bill would solve this problem in its entirety; it was 
widely believed that the financial contributions would find their way around the 
restrictions. The bill, for example, restricted the financial contributions to political 
election campaigns ahead of elections but did not restrict contributions after the 
election. President Bush, for example, expected to raise $ 40 million from the 
private sector to pay for his inaugural ceremonies and it would be naïve to believe 
that the contributors did not expect any political favors in return for their 
contributions. 
A common misperception in the debate regarding financial contributions to the 
political process is that money is the problem; that things will get better as soon as 
financial contributions are outlawed. However, money has no agency; it cannot 
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act or communicate by itself since it is just a human instrument that enables 
humans to exchange values and ultimately status. Blaming money for the 
shortcomings of the political process is like blaming the neighbor’s trumpet rather 
than the neighbor for the noise that comes out of the neighbor’s apartment during 
the early morning hours.  
The source of the shortcomings of the political process is not the instrument 
itself but rather the individual citizen’s obsession with status, which triumphs 
almost any other cultural value (like equality). Individuals are cultivated from an 
early age to compete for status and recognition, and some individuals are willing 
to engage in more or less corruptive behavior in order to receive advantages in the 
competition for higher status. Institutional restrictions on financial contributions to 
political actors have little direct8 effect as long as individuals set a high priority to 
the advancement of their own status compared to the norms condemning the same 
kind of behavior. A similar historical example was when Protestants and Catholics 
in 19th century Europe set different priorities to humanistic and status enhancing 
activities; Catholics prioritized social relationships whereas Protestants were more 
concerned with the productivity aspects related to time (Max Weber, 1958). 
Weber traces these value differences back to the structure and teachings of 
Catholicism and Calvinism but it is still ultimately the priority that we set to 
                                                 
8 The effects of institutional restrictions on political financial contributions may be 
more indirect in the sense that it could help redefine cultural norms. That is, laws 
restricting financial contributions may stop some contributions in the short run but 
the main impact appears if it contributes to long-term cultural changes. 
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different values that guides our motives and actions. Weber also related the 
specific (work) ethic of Protestants back to what Robert Putnam 90 years later 
defined as social capital. Punctuality enabled people to trust each other and 
therefore lend each other the material resources necessary for economic 
development.9            
Another common problem related to political participation is the use of absolute 
definitions of important concepts like democracy and democratic behavior. That 
is, members of the societal elite, such as academic scholars and politicians, 
analyze political behavior based on what they perceive to be an absolute definition 
of specific concepts regardless of how the broader public defines the same 
concepts. Different subjective definitions of concepts should not be considered 
irrelevant since they most likely affect the subject’s motives and ultimately her 
actions; the way we define things is an extension of our values. American legal 
scholars generally do not consider financial contributions to political 
representatives to be corruption since there are no explicit favors attached to the 
financial contribution; from their perspective, the definition of corruption does not 
include implicit expectations. However, that does not mean that a large part of the 
U.S. public does not consider the same financial contributions to be corruptive and 
therefore receives a less favorable view of the political process. The societal elite 
and parts of the broader public simply do not perceive things in the same way due 
                                                 
9 Economist Francis Fukoyama (1980) described the relationship between trust 
and economic development before Putnam attributed the same relationship to the 
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to differences in values and definitions. James MacGregor Burns experienced a 
similar type of problem when interacting with a poor family in Mexico City: 
What struck me the most was the sheer impenetrability of their lives. 
Nothing – government, business, school, church – seemed to connect with 
them. This profound isolation from the main currents of society, I believe, 
as much as material privation, defines the world’s poor, most of whom are 
worse off than the Sanchez family members were. Can anything reach 
them? Only the kind of leadership that would enter into their lives, not to 
preach to them or placate them but to connect with them on their terms, as 
the initial action in helping them realize their human potential. (Burns, 
2003, p. 230) 
 
The average US citizen, who possesses a very limited amount of political 
knowledge, starts his or her political reasoning from a specific value base 
(Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991); political opinions from that perspective 
represent values rather than an “objective” or “rational” substantive evaluation.  
Burns come to the same conclusion:  
Public values are the most powerful of principles because they represent 
the most broadly relevant, deeply felt, longest lasting, morally grounded 
commitments humankind can make. They are actually or potentially 
powerful sources. Public values such as liberty, justice, equality, happiness 
that have endured, flourished, and evolved over centuries, that are based in 
human wants and needs, that dominate people’s hopes and fears and 
expectations, that deeply influence their social and political attitudes and 
shape much of their day-to-day behavior – ultimately such values have a 
huge causal effect. (Burns, 2003, pp. 205-206) 
 
Values and definitions therefore affect the way we perceive the world around 
us; a person’s perception of the current society is, for example, dependent on how 
she defines fairness. The idea (ideology) that it is possible to determine an 
absolute evaluation to every communicative situation is not only troubling but 
                                                                                                                                                 
economic developments in southern and northern Italy.  
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also dictatorial. You are only allowed to use the definition that leads to the 
conclusion that the U.S. society is a fair society; your perception of what is going 
on in the U.S. society is therefore not only wrong but also unacceptable. Our 
values and definitions come from our cultivation and socialization process as well 
as our individual experiences and are therefore highly subjective yet inescapable; 
we can only make sense of a situation from our own subjective perspective. I have 
not shared your experiences and cultivation process and therefore cannot see the 
situation from your perspective, let alone from some kind of objective perspective 
independent of anyone’s individual experiences. Eric Kramer (2004) describes the 
political consequences of this in the following way: 
What if we read history from the point-of-view of the horse, or slaves, or 
women?  What if we read the story of the U.S. Viet Nam War from the 
point-of-view of a Saigon prostitute or her half African-American child?  It 
will be a very different story than that offered by the Pentagon.  Is it 
therefore wrong?  Decidedly not.  Instead, reality is suddenly exposed as 
complex, with infinite perspectives all of which are equally “true” and 
“false,” sometimes contradictory.  This discursive move violates the 
authority of the “official” or original text allowing for a whole new way of 
seeing and telling the story.  It also violates the sacred law of modernity 
which is the law of non-contradiction and strictly defined truth.  
Polycentric insight erases the modern line between a singular, self-
contained and fixed truth, and falsehood.  As one can imagine, it tends to 
upset those in authority, who want “the story,” reality, to be seen only from 
their perspective (Kramer, 2004, p. 106). 
   
Absolute interpretations are sometimes credited to both academic scholars 
trying to establish some kind of objective interpretation and to religious Christian 
representatives advancing a religious agenda, but it is important to highlight the 
difference between the two. Social scientists claiming that only one objective 
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interpretation exists tend to assume that all other interpretations are biased and 
therefore invalid; there is no alternative to the objective interpretation. Christian 
leaders, on the other hand, generally emphasize that we have a choice: we can 
either see the world from a Christian perspective or from a non-Christian 
perspective – that is, we can see the world with or without Christian values as the 
value-base for our perception.10 The former is regarded as a better perspective but 
it can only be better if an alternative perspective actually exists. There are still 
many religious leaders claiming that the religious perspective represents the only 
truth, just as some social scientists claim that their “objective” observations 
represent the only truth, but if something represents the “Truth” then it effectively 
means that everything else does not exist and that the one and only “Truth” lacks a 
relative standing. 
However, culture, just like mechanical causes or money, does not have the 
power to act; it has no agency to act by itself but instead acts through people. 
People act on motives – cultures do not. A culture helps us put a specific action 
into context, or rather: culture is the context (Geertz, 1973). Culture does not tell 
us how to do things – it tries to explain why we do things. People, in places where 
punctuality and time-efficiency is not as important as it is in New York and 
Boston, still know how to figure out what time it is; they just do not pay the same 
attention to it. A culture therefore helps us understand the what and the why of 
                                                 




values, but that is not to say that culture is the cause and accurately predicts 
specific actions. It is the members of the culture through their social interaction 
that determine the what and the why of the future, which effectively means that it 
constantly changes.    
The conflict between the intent of achieving absolute interpretations and the 
intent of recognizing multiple perspectives was exemplified during the 2004 
Summer Olympics in Athens. Europeans tend to believe that norms and standards 
change with trends taking place over long periods of time; what happened 3000 or 
even 100 years ago should not be evaluated based on contemporary norms and 
standards.  
Some American TV viewers complained about the nudity in the opening 
ceremonies of the Olympic Games, which prompted the FCC to consider 
punishing NBC for airing indecency. The nudity involved actors portraying 
statues from ancient Greece; a time in which nudity was common both within and 
outside athletic events. However, some American viewers (at least partly 
supported by the FCC) implied that standards of indecency are absolute and 
eternal independent of context. The Chief of the Athens games, Gianna 
Angelopoulos-Daskalaki disagreed:  
If NBC is punished for airing our opening ceremonies – which in reality 
depicted Greek contributions to civilization – it would, in effect, label a 
presentation of our culture on your airwaves as indecent. . . . As Americans 
surely are aware, there is great hostility in the world today to cultural 
domination in which a single value system created elsewhere diminishes 
                                                                                                                                                 
people to come and meet Jesus and discover a new perspective of the world.  
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and degrades local cultures (The Norman Transcript, 01-20-05, B:1 & USA 
Today, 01-18-05, p. C:1) 
  
The complexity and importance of definitions puzzle the legal system, which 
relies on firm definitions in order to create the highest possible reliability and 
predictability. What constitutes a crime is dependent on the definition of each 
criminal offense, which is supposed to be independent of contexts such as time 
and culture. For example, Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) defined (or 
did not define) obscenity in the following way: “I shall not today attempt further 
to define [hard-core pornography] . . . . But I know it when I see it.” In other 
words, Justice Stewart could only recognize hard-core pornography based on his 
own subjective perspective which was dependent on his values. 
This is not exclusively a legal or social scientific phenomenon. Peter Medawar, 
Noble Prize winner in Medicine 1960, claims that “there is no such thing as 
unprejudiced observation.” Everything we do, including scientific activity, is 
based on what Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to as enabling or blind prejudice. It is 
impossible to not base our decisions and actions on what we have been exposed to 
earlier in life. Medawar asks how “a mere act of mind lead to the discovery of 
new information? It would violate a law as fundamental as the law of conservation 
of information” (Medawar, 1964).   
This essay is based on the assumption that multiple perspectives exist; that 
definitions and values are not absolute in the sense that everyone automatically 
shares the same definitions and values when they are trying to make sense of what 
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happens around them. This does not mean that anything goes – that we can use 
whatever definition we find convenient at the time. It rather speaks to the 
necessity of examining, discussing, and deliberating about the values that affect 
how we perceive the world around us. Michel Foucault11 claims that truth is not in 
any way universal but rather a local product of commonly accepted norms.12 
Truth in one society is different from truth in another society because “the types of 
discourse which it [each society] accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements” (1980, p. 131) are communal rather than universal.  
It is therefore impossible to discover any eternal truth that holds against all 
contextual considerations. People are constantly battling about what should be 
considered the truth based on what they consider to be logical and reasonable 
applications of knowledge and language.    
There is a battle ‘for truth’, or at least ‘around truth’ – it being understood 
once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to 
be discovered and accepted’, but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to 
which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power 
attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a 
battle ‘on behalf of the truth’ but of a battle about the status of truth and the 
economic and political role it plays. (Foucault, 1980, p. 132) 
   
                                                 
11 Foucault constantly refers to Nietzsche’s ideas regarding truth and knowledge 
as for example expressed in the Gay Science.  
12 However, Foucault’s use of the term “truth” is puzzling. Jean Paul Sartre, for 
example, claims that is hard to claim that there is no universal but yet communal 
truth and that the only reasonable conclusion therefore should be that the only 
truth is that there is no truth (Bernstein, 1983).  
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Foucault therefore describes truth and knowledge in terms of a regime, 
“systems of power which produce and sustain itself” (1980, p. 133). Truth is never 
independent of power – it is produced within powerful regimes. Evelyn Fox 
Keller (1999) regards the attempt to portray science as a mirror of nature as an 
attempt to gain societal authority. A person who claims that she knows the 
absolute truth is “unassailable. But if truth is relative, if science is divorced from 
nature and married instead to culture (or “interests”), then the privileged status of 
that authority is fatally undermined” (p. 239). Democracy from that perspective is 
ultimately an issue of how we define concepts, reason and truth – whether every 
citizen has the opportunity to actively and equally participate in what Wittgenstein 
described as the social construction of knowledge. The important matter is 
therefore not the content of knowledge but rather how knowledge is “produced” 
(metaknowledge). Martin Kylhammar and Jean-Francois Battail relate to this issue 
in the following way: 
How do we combine a vision of equal participation with power resting on 
knowledge? Could a society based on knowledge be a society for everyone, 
doesn’t it risk excluding those who can’t or doesn’t want to gain reflective 
knowledge or metaknowledge? This is a genuine, lasting, and increasingly 
important problem for the modern society. We are ignoring the reality if we 
refuse to face that dilemma. (Kylhammar & Battail, 2003, p. 57) 
 
The next chapter addresses this problem and presents a thesis holding that the 
everyday social interaction among all members of society is the key to a strong 
democracy. The focus needs to move away from the societal elite to the broad 
public – from formal official deliberation to informal everyday interaction. Only 
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through broad social interaction can we identify generally accepted common 
reason; common agreements upon what constitute a good argument and therefore 
good policies.  
   
Deliberation in the Public Sphere 
[I]n any political election, even by universal suffrage, the voter is under an 
absolute moral obligation to consider the interests of the public, not his 
private advantage, and give his vote to the best of his judgment, exactly as 
he were bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election dependent 
on him alone.  
John Stuart Mill, 1978, p. 208 
  
Mill’s description of a democracy guided by common rather than private 
interest was nothing new to Europe in 1862. Rousseau in The Social Contract 
(1968) outlined a more radical version of the same idea. Alexis de Tocqueville 
(1990) claimed that 19th century American democracy was guided by a “self-
interest properly understood;” (p.526) – a self-interest that recognizes that 
communal progress is necessary for private progress. The idea that private interest 
is dependent on communal interest and therefore should guide political behavior is 
also prevalent in the literature on deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy has been examined in a wide range of primarily 
theoretical literature. Many scholars within different fields (Political Science, 
Philosophy, Communication, etc.) have attempted to present a normative picture 
of democracy that satisfies our preferences for effective governing with egalitarian 
democratic procedures. Citizens are expected to actively participate in the whole 
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decision-making process (especially the deliberation preceding the decision) with 
their common interest rather then a narrow pursuit of self-interest in mind. They 
are supposed to use and be persuaded by reason rather than “manipulative, 
coercive, or emotive appeals”; and they are supposed to honor “political equality 
of all members of the citizenry” rather than set themselves on top of the political 
process (Valadez, 2001, pp. 31-32).  
Less literature is devoted to examining the practical application of deliberative 
democracy (Ryfe, 2002); we seem to know how we ideally like to proceed but 
have little evidence for whether it actually works. However, there is an underlying 
recognition in a lot of the literature on deliberative democracy that there is a 
conflict between the aspirational and the attainable; how much and what kind of 
participation can we possibly expect from the public? A similar source of conflict 
involves the nature of the consent necessary for a decision to be effectively 
implemented yet legitimate. Joshua Cohen (1986) and David Estlund (1997), for 
example, argue that we cannot expect, nor is it desirable, to achieve full epistemic 
consensus as described by Rousseau in The Social Contract.13 Yet, Cohen and 
Estlund do not find a simple agreement on the nature of political procedures 
epistemic enough but instead propose a combination of epistemic proceduralism 
                                                 
13 Zev Trachtenberg (1993), for example, argues that Rousseau outlines an ideal 
political system while presenting contradictive sets of skills necessary to make 
this kind of system work. Rousseau prescribes active citizens taking part in a 
debate about what constitutes the common good. However, at the same time, he 
fears the implementation process and therefore ends up arguing for a citizenry 
lacking critical evaluation skills.   
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that “requires obedience, not any surrender of moral judgment” (Estlund, 1997, p. 
198). The individual citizen needs to understand that it is in her best interest to 
respect a decision for the general progression of society. Opposing a majority 
decision would violate the core principle of an epistemic democracy: the notion 
that the deliberative process creates the best decision as it is manifested in a 
majority decision.          
Henry Richardson (1997) argues that an effective deliberative democracy 
requires shared democratic intentions. Citizens need to be committed to the same 
outcome, which is only possible through rigorous communication. Jürgen 
Habermas presents a normative version of democracy based on deliberative 
practices as part of his larger theory of Communicative Action (1984). Habermas 
argues that people are able to coordinate their social actions through the institution 
of communication – that is, communication is the foundation of all social activity. 
Reason is therefore based on communication; we understand each other and act 
according to the understanding that occurs through the exchange of 
communicative symbols. Reason, just like grammar, could not be reduced to any 
form of probability model or universal and absolute rules – it is determined and 
learned through interaction.14  
Habermas is therefore not a conservative; he recognizes that the categories and 
criteria used to determine the truth are human inventions rather than naturally 
                                                 
14 See also Noam Chomsky’s (1959) response to B.F. Skinner’s attempt to 
systemize verbal behavior.   
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occurring phenomena. However, he still refuses to surrender to the post-modern 
notion that all perspectives are equally rational. Habermas claims that the same 
form of understanding that occurs between two interacting citizens can be 
extended to the public sphere; citizens can agree upon what constitutes reason and 
ultimately the common good as well as the truth through communicative activities.  
Communicative reason differs from practical reason first and foremost in 
that it is no longer ascribed to the individual actor or to a macrosubject at 
the level of the state or the whole society. Rather, what makes 
communicative reason possible is the linguistic medium through which 
interactions are woven together and forms of life are structured. This 
rationality is inscribed in the linguistic telos of mutual understanding and 
forms an ensemble of conditions that both enable and limit. Whoever 
makes use of a natural language in order to come to an understanding with 
an addressee about something in the world is required to take a 
performative attitude and commit herself to certain presuppositions. In 
seeking to reach an understanding, natural-language users must assume, 
among other things, that the participants pursue their illocutionary goals 
without reservations, that they tie their agreement to the intersubjective 
recognition of criticizable validity claims, and that they are ready to take on 
the obligations resulting form consensus and relevant for further 
interaction. (Habermas, 1998, p. 3-4) 
 
The societal elite has traditionally dominated the communicative process. This 
has resulted in an elitist version of reason and truth and therefore an oligarchy 
rather than a democracy. The ultimate communication in the public sphere should 
therefore be free from references to status and tradition; it assumes that all citizens 
actively participate in the public sphere on an equal basis. Here, Habermas is 
influenced by Hans-George Gadamer (1955) and his description of a genuine 
conversation: a conversation in which participants communicate to produce 
something new and not just reproduce what already exists in their minds. It is a 
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conversation in which participants communicate to connect in order to create 
something communal rather than persuade to advance their own self-interest.  
From that perspective, reason is inherently inclusive and egalitarian; it evolves 
directly from the interaction between citizens of equal status pursuing communal 
rather than individual interests. Citizens both learn and agree upon what is 
considered good reason through their communicative interaction. Truth and reason 
are neither natural nor absolute and cannot be explored through individual 
thinking processes as prescribed by Plato. Rather, truth and reason are social and 
identified communally when different perspectives are allowed to connect through 
communication. One person may hypothetically be able to identify an objective 
and absolute truth but he or she is still dependent on communal definitions and 
categorizations in order to describe the objective truth to the rest of the world. In 
other words, a shared truth, regardless of whether it is objective or communal in 
nature, is dependent on communal communicative structures. An extension of the 
idea that truth and reason are communal in nature is that only those who 
participate in the interaction in a specific society know what constitutes good 
reason – the legitimacy that comes with reason is not a product of formal 
institutions; it is a product of interaction.15
                                                 
15 “Since the days of Max Weber this [researchers’ refrain from any systematic 
judgment] has been regarded as a virtue; however, even if one adopts this 
interpretation, the suspicion remains that legitimacy, the belief in legitimacy, and 
the willingness to comply with motivation through “good reasons.” But whether 
reasons are “good reasons” can be ascertained only in the performative attitude of 
a participant in argumentation, and not through the neutral observation of what 
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C.P. Snow argues in The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1961) that 
natural scientists and traditional conservative intellectuals at British universities 
do not understand each other due to a lack of interaction. Two distinct cultures 
exist within the British academic world and these two groups have a hard time 
finding common ground. Each side fails to understand the other side’s perspective 
and therefore do not agree upon what constitutes good academic activity. The 
solution to this, according to Snow, is to have the two groups interact more and 
therefore learn to work towards common goals.  
Snow’s analysis is limited to the academic community but it speaks to the 
importance of social interaction in society in general. If different kinds of 
academic intellectuals do not even understand each other due to a lack of 
interaction, then what are the prospects of having “ordinary” citizens understand 
academic intellectuals and agree upon what constitutes good reasoning? There has 
to be a strong and inclusive public sphere where all members of all cultures and 
groups learn to understand each other through broad social interaction.  
                                                                                                                                                 
this or that participant in a discourse holds to be good reasons” (Habermas, 1979, 
p. 200).  
What constitutes reason and legitimacy is important to the conceptualization of 
democracy and Habermas claims that democracy cannot be defined in terms of 
procedures because then “questions of democratization can be treated as what they 
are: as organizational questions. For it then depends on the concrete social and 
political conditions, on scopes of disposition, on information, and so forth, which 
types of organization and which mechanisms are in each case better suited to 
bring about procedurally legitimate decisions and institutions. . . Democratization 
can not mean an a priori preference for a specific type of organization, for 




The nature of communication is crucial to this issue. Claude Shannon and 
Warren Weaver (1949) have (unfortunately16) been associated with the process 
perspective of communication where a sender sends a message to a receiver. This 
kind of communication does not produce any meaning or ideas, it only transfers 
ideas. John Fiske argues that this simplistic perspective may have a few 
advantages but that it “sees communication as a determinant, and improving 
communication as a way of increasing social control” (Fiske, 1982, p. 157). Fiske 
prefers the semiotic perspective of communication where meaning and culture is 
produced rather than imposed. This would also be the perspective that is closest to 
Habermas’s (1984) Theory of Communicative Action.      
Habermas summarizes his ideas in what he refers to as the Ideal Speech 
Situation with the following elements: 
1. Each person participating in a rhetorical situation has the right both to express 
his or her ideas freely and to examine and criticize other’s ideas. 
2. There is no use of force or power; reason rather than status determines the 
strength of an argument. 
3. Arguments based on traditions (which tend to superimpose the past onto the 
present) need to be exposed. That is, something is not necessarily reasonable 
only because it is the way things traditionally have been done. 
                                                 
16 Claude Shannon was working for a telephone company and Warren Weaver 
was professor of Mathematics. They later claimed that their structural modal for 
communication never was intended to function in the complexity that surrounds 
general human communication. 
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4. Consensus (or an adherence of mind) between the members of the rhetorical 
situation is necessary in order to determine the “truth”.         
A democratic arrangement is therefore one in which the public has the 
opportunity (including time) to freely hear and debate many different perspectives 
and proposals – where reason grows out of inclusive deliberation. Democracy is 
enhanced when the public becomes more autonomous in their pursuit of reason – 
when possible restrictions (coercion, traditions, status, etc.) in the deliberative 
process are reduced. This does not mean that an argument based on authority or 
tradition is automatically disqualified since it is impossible to escape our past and 
our societal structure. It rather speaks to the necessity to constantly and critically 
evaluate the actual reason that is attached to arguments connected to authority and 
traditions. Reason is, from that perspective, based in present time and not the 
traditions and hierarchies that are representations of the past.          
Habermas argues that techne (academic knowledge and technology) does not 
constitute praxis and he therefore objects to any form of elitist version of 
democracy. Scientists and other “technocrats” are important in society but 
Habermas strongly rejects the elevated status of scientists as described by 
positivists like August Comte. The power to define good policies should not be 
limited to “technocrats”; an inclusive deliberative process in the public sphere 
ultimately determines what constitutes good policies. In fact, it may be impossible 
to build common reason when all values and definitions are determined by one 
exclusive group in the public sphere (like academic scholars). Other members of 
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the public sphere may not understand and therefore may not recognize the merit of 
an argument or an idea if they do not agree upon the values and definitions behind 
the argument.17  
Habermas has been criticized for presenting a version of authority that is too 
negative in nature, as if authority could not have any positive influence on a 
group.18 What Habermas appears to fear the most is the use of authority to force 
specific outcomes but also the belief that specific knowledge could be 
independent of virtue. Goldman (1980) argues that experts within narrow areas 
(technocrats) tend to look at professional issues from an isolated perspective as if 
anything taking place in their specific area is independent of wider social 
judgments and human interests. Having only technocrats dominating the 
deliberative process is therefore dangerous since it could produce decisions 
contradicting each other and that are independent of what citizens collectively 
determine to be good praxis. 
                                                 
17 Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) argues that knowledge is anything but absolute in 
nature. What is considered important knowledge in one context (time, place, etc.) 
may be considered useless in another. Lyotard questions the notion of academic 
knowledge that is generally unknown to the public: what is the use of knowledge 
when very few understand it and it still greatly affects highly politically relevant 
decisions? That kind of knowledge may give more political power to social 
scientists (technocrats) and less democratic autonomy to the public sphere.      
18 For example, should we consider Mahatma Gandhi’s, Martin Luther King’s, 
and Nelson Mandela’s leaderships as negative? The general public would 
probably say no but Habermas is less interested in the political leadership on the 
highest level in society than in the leadership that takes place in the every-day-life 
of people in the public sphere.   
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Nietzsche (1974) discusses the elevated status of techne (scientific knowledge) 
in The Gay Science and argues that it primarily is a modern phenomenon:  
In antiquity the dignity and recognition of sciences were diminished by the 
fact that even her most zealous disciples placed the striving for virtue first, 
and only felt that knowledge had received the highest praise when one 
celebrated it as the best means to virtue. It is something new in history that 
knowledge wants to be more than a mere means. (p. 180) 
 
Human autonomy and agency are challenged when we treat scientific 
knowledge as an absolute ideology. Why should people even bother with getting 
out of bed in the morning if scientific observations are elevated to a status in 
which everything is predetermined? There is nothing left to discuss and no room 
for values when scientific findings are treated as the one and only truth. Habermas 
argues that humans can communicate to agree but that the agreements must be 
based on more than mere scientific observations. The only eternal thing would be 
the conversation itself since we are constantly forced to apply new perspectives 
due to constant changes in our environment.  
Habermas has also been criticized for proposing a political system that is 
impossible to fully implement; that the Ideal Speech Situation is far beyond what 
we can accomplish in any foreseeable future. Yet Page and Shapiro (1992) claim 
that the American public, as an aggregated collective, acts both rationally and 
according to the deliberative norms described by, for example, Habermas: 
The system does not require a set of identical, “omnicompetent” citizens, 
as one brand of democratic mythology seems to prescribe. Instead, some 
people specialize in policy. Researchers apply special knowledge and 
technique to produce policy-relevant information. Others – policy analysts, 
experts and commentators – gather and examine and test those results, put 
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them together into coherent solutions to policy problems, and communicate 
them to each other and to the public. Thus ordinary citizens need not 
master intricacies of policy analysis, but can learn enough to form 
intelligent preferences simply by knowing whom to trust for reliable 
conclusions - assuming, of course, that trustworthy cue givers are available 
and that the information provided by them is sufficiently unbiased.” (p. 
365) 
 
Page and Shapiro’s notion of collective deliberative rationalism is a major 
“modification” of Habermas’ ideas. Relying on academic technocrats for the bulk 
of all analysis (without any influence from the broader public) creates an 
environment in which policies may be based on status instead of reason. This is 
especially the case if we consider that “truth” can only be recognized through 
consensus building without the use of authority and force. Page and Shapiro also 
ignore the fact that broad deliberation increases the public’s ability to actively 
support and implement a policy once they agree upon the reasons behind the 
policy. More importantly, Habermas claims that consensus can only grow out of 
conflict – it is the reason which grows out of conflicting perspectives and 
arguments that enables an effective implementation. Suppressing conflict by, for 
example, only giving voice to the perspectives of experts does not lead to faith in 
the actual reason but rather to faith in the expert.       
However, Habermas argues that his theory explains how we can build a 
stronger public sphere and a more democratic civic culture – we can always 
attempt to pursue broader societal understanding and better-supported decisions 
by adding people with additional perspectives and information to a speech 
situation. The Ideal Speech Situation is therefore aspirational rather than utopian. 
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The idea that one single policy could make society perfect is from a Habermasian 
perspective absurd. Many policies pointing in the same direction may help change 
the cultural values that guide people’s motives but only as part of a long-term 
cultivation process. Habermas is reconstructive in his approach; he believes that a 
democratic culture could be achieved through the cultivation of specific attitudes 
and values and that this requires support for institutions that foster political 
discourse. However, the cultivation process is not aimed at directly reconstructing 
specific absolute values; rather, it is aimed at directing citizens to actively 
participate in the public sphere while respecting the equal status of all members of 
the public sphere and, through the process of communication, determine the 
common values that direct societal interaction. 
Habermas’ idea therefore does not constitute a regular ideology19; it is a theory 
explaining how people build understanding, reciprocity, and norms through social 
interaction. Social interaction could be more or less democratic since democracy 
ultimately refers to the way people relate to each other in their daily interaction. 
That is, norms can be more or less democratic but norms are not given to us – they 
are created by us.  
Let us, for example, assume that two people are about to pass each other on a 
sidewalk. The coordination of the passing process could lack any references to 
social norms, which would be a state of anarchy where the participants do not 
                                                 
19 It could be labeled a meta-ideology since it prescribes a specific kind of 
interaction to every situation. 
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make any attempt to recognize the communal aspects of the passing event. The 
passing process could be characterized by status recognition; a hierarchical state 
in which one person is expected to clear the way so that the other person (with the 
higher status) does not have to make any adjustments. Finally, the passing process 
could also be guided by a common understanding of the norms guiding the 
interaction in a democratic way. Both persons could, for example, walk to the 
right of the sidewalk; in that case, they would recognize both the communal nature 
of the event and that they share an equal status. The norms guiding this form of 
democratic behavior stem from our social interaction – they are products of the 
communication that takes place on a daily basis. One person forcing another 
person to clear the way supports hierarchical rather than democratic interaction; 
people constantly make small decisions that have great effects on our social 
norms.             
The above example could be extended to communication in the public sphere – 
the civil society. Social norms and directions are deliberated and determined in the 
public sphere, and it is an arena extending far beyond formal governmental 
institutions:      
What is meant by “civil society” today, in contrast to its usage in the 
Marxist tradition, no longer includes the economy as constituted by private 
law and steered through markets in labor, capital, and commodities. Rather, 
its institutional core comprises those nongovernmental and non-economic 
connections and voluntary associations that anchor the communication 
structures of the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld. 
Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal 
problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such 
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reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society 
comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving 
discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of the 
organized public sphere. (Habermas, 1998, p. 366) 
  
However, there are forces in society that do not benefit from building a stronger 
public sphere; forces that do not like to see a more active, powerful, and 
democratic civil society. Some political actors (including some businesses) want 
to maintain a status quo in which political voices are unequal and where these 
actors enjoy special privileges and therefore have an incentive to fragmentize the 
public sphere. Here, Habermas receives supports from Neustadt in his analysis of 
political distrust in America: 
Deep distrust does serve the purposes of some participants in public policy, 
limiting action, diverting attention, feeding the permanent campaign. But 
the result is less capacity for reliable consensus-building and for coalition 
maintenance (Neustadt, 1997, p. 200) 
 
Benjamin Barber (1984), although not agreeing with the normative aspects, 
describes a pluralist democracy in terms of “bargaining and exchange among free 
and equal individuals and groups, which pursue their private interests in a market 
setting governed by the social contract” (p. 143). Some scholars and theories work 
with the assumption that this kind of competition of interests is natural and that 
restricting competition is therefore negative. John Locke in the Second Treatise of 
Government (1980) assigned government the role of an umpire; government 
should make sure that citizens respect the basic rules of the competition but most 
of all respect the actual (material) outcome of the competition. Robert Dahl (1956) 
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in his contemporary pluralist model builds his version of democracy on 
competition between different societal interest groups.  
However, the question of whether human competition is a product of nature or 
nurture is irrelevant to the question of whether a society should allow for, or even 
encourage competition between citizens. It appears natural for babies to slap, 
push, or even bite each other (or their parents) when someone resists their will. 
People have also through all ages (at least in western societies) enjoyed watching 
other people hit each other in one form or another (wrestling, boxing, football, 
hockey, etc.). Still, most western societies attempt to restrict fighting rather than 
encourage it; society does not encourage people to solve their differences and 
conflicts with physical fighting based on the premise that fighting is “natural” for 
humans.20 In other words, competition, just like fighting, is a normative issue. 
Society may allow or even encourage it based on assumed positive effects and not 
because it is something that people cannot be cultivated to resist: it is an indication 
of a culture’s hierarchy of values. It is ultimately an issue of praxis rather then 
techne.   
Deliberation, Social Interaction, and Social Capital 
The idea that a strong civil society is formed and maintained through citizen 
interaction in voluntary organization is essentially the same idea as advanced by 
                                                 
20 Cicero introduced “humanitas” to the ancient Roman culture in order to 
distinguish well-cultivated citizens from barbarians. A humane society is from 
Cicero’s perspective a society where people are taught to interact peacefully. 
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Robert Putnam in his analysis of civic life in Italy (1993) and America (2000). 
Putnam refers to the norms and trust that develop through civic interaction as 
social capital; a term earlier used in academic research by James Coleman. 
Coleman (1988) attempts to bridge two common social action perspectives: the 
social norm governed perspective and the maximizing utility (rational choice) 
perspective. He argues that people make choices, they have agency, but these 
choices are based on the perceived power of community norms: social capital.  
Just as physical capital and human capital facilitates productive activity, social 
capital does as well. For example, a group within which there is extensive 
trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish more than a comparable 
group without trustworthiness and trust. (Coleman, 1988, p. S101) 
 
Coleman identifies three forms of social capital: (1) obligations, expectations, 
and trustworthiness: the credit that we owe each other; (2) information channels 
(communication): social relations and trust cannot develop without the potential 
for exchange of information, and; (3) norms and effective sanctions.  
A prescriptive norm within a collectivity that constitutes an especially important 
form of social capital is the norm that one should forgo self-interest and act in the 
interest of the collectivity. A norm of this sort, reinforced by social support, status, 
honor, and other rewards, is the social capital that builds young nations. 
(Coleman, 1988, p. S104) 
    This obviously relates back to Tocqueville’s notion of “enlightened self-
interest” as described in Democracy in America (1848). Robert Putnam argues 
                                                                                                                                                 
Primatologist Desmond Morris (1985) argues that humans have succeeded as a 
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that social capital is strongly related to the concept of civic virtue but social 
capital is a communal institution that develops through social interaction: 
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers 
to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among 
individuals –social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely 
related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that 
“social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful 
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. A society 
of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social 
capital. (Putnam, 2000, p. 19) 
 
In other words, Putnam and Coleman, just like Habermas, focus on the 
interaction between citizens rather than formal political rules and institutions. 
Democracy starts with the way that people relate to each other and can only be 
sustained through the bonds and common understanding that develop through 
social interaction. 
Putnam (2000) argues that the lower levels of social interaction (in voluntary 
organizations for example) have caused a decrease in the social capital levels in 
the U.S.; that we have lost the foundation for a healthy democracy. People, for 
example, tend to bowl individually instead of in bowling leagues and individual 
private activities do not create the bonds that enable citizens to work together 
effectively in communal arrangements.21  
                                                                                                                                                 
species because of our ability to communicate and cooperate.    
21 Putnam’s analysis of social capital in the U.S. is based on his research on the 
development of social capital in Italy. He describes in Making democracy work 
(1993) how northern Italy developed strong political (and economic) institutions 
out of the trust and norms that developed in voluntary organizational activities. 
The people that interacted frequently in different organizations learned to trust 
44 
 
The ideas that Coleman and Putnam present on communal trust are nothing new 
to the scientific community. Steven Vaitkus (1990), for example, building on the 
work of George Herber Mead, claims that social order is totally dependent on trust 
but that trust develops without the ability to confirm motives and intentions. Eric 
Kramer (1992, p. 45) therefore concludes that cooperation and community “is the 
behavioral expression of integrality” where “integrality yields a sense that is 
neither temporal nor eternal” but rather an appreciation of what Martin Buber 
refers to as the Other. In other words, temporal perspectives are important to the 
issue of social trust (which also is the focus of the next chapter).  
Anthony Giddens relates trust to time-space distanciation. “Because of its 
inherent connection with absence, trust is always bound up with modes of 
organising “reliable” interactions across time-space” (Giddens, 1990, p. 100-101). 
Trust in the pre-modern society was based on kinship, local community, religious 
cosmologies, and traditions where members of the society had relatively few but 
yet deep social encounters. Trust in the modern society is related to personal 
relationships of friendship, abstract systems and is future oriented. Giddens claims 
that especially the abstract expert systems require high levels of trust since it is 
impossible for the modern citizen to ignore the pronouncements of often-unknown 
experts. 
                                                                                                                                                 
each other enough to work together in political institutions as well as in communal 
credit unions.  
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Putnam’s theory of social capital has received plenty of attention both inside 
and outside the academic community. Levi (1996) argues that it is hard for social 
trust to develop in a situation of competition between citizens and that Putnam is 
therefore discrediting the role of government in the creation of trust. Governments 
that protect merit and property, but also help create an environment in which 
citizens are protected from the most brutal part of the competition, help facilitate 
trust. People can afford to trust each other once they know that their own success 
does not stand in direct conflict with someone else’s success. Another critique of 
Putnam is that the mechanism in the theory is unclear: what is it about 
participation in voluntary organization that makes people trust each other? (See 
Brehm & Rahn, 1997 and Claibourne & Martin, 2000)  
Alan Wolfe’s (2002) critique of Putnam has a normative rather than a 
mechanical focus. Wolfe claims that Putnam’s argument regarding the importance 
of civic participation is unclear about what civic participation is supposed to do 
for society: “to call for more democracy without raising the question of 
democracy for what is to leave morality out of the picture entirely.” (p. 130)  
What Brehm and Rahn, Claibourne and Martin as well as Wolfe are missing in 
their critiques of Putnam is that civic participation in an active public sphere, 
creates the same commonly agreed upon moral standards and norms that Wolfe 
claims are missing in society today. Active and inclusive social interaction creates 
meaning that people agree upon; people determine (inclusively) what is 
considered right or wrong; what makes a good argument, etc. An extension of this 
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is that less civic participation creates a moral decline; not because people 
‘objectively’ behave more immorally but because there is less communal 
agreement upon what constitutes meaning and therefore, moral behavior. From the 
same perspective, the loss of morality in society is a result of increasing societal 
segregation where people spend less time together determining (often 
unconsciously) what constitutes reason and ultimately moral standards.  
Those criticizing Putnam generally fail to fully recognize Habermas’ theoretical 
framework22 –  the idea that communication and social interaction is necessary for 
the development of understanding, reason, and norms. We cannot reach common 
understanding regarding what constitutes meaning and norms unless we interact 
and communicate about these issues. It is impossible to trust other citizens unless 
there are expectations regarding specific behavior because trust involves actions 
that affirm expected behavior. It is therefore unlikely that social capital can only 
develop inside voluntary civic organizations since most social interaction takes 
part outside formal organizations. That is, all social interaction has an affect on 
the social capital levels in society. Putnam here distinguishes between the social 
capital formed in formal organizations (formal social capital) and social capital 
formed when citizens just happen to be in the same pub or in the same intramural 
                                                 
22 Putnam’s ideas regarding social capital (both in definition and function) are 
clearly related to Habermas’ description of the public sphere, but Putnam seldom 
recognizes these similarities. However, Habermas, especially in his early work 
like The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
category of Bourgeois Society, focuses a lot on the interaction in which ‘serious’ 
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basketball game (informal social capital). Both forms of social capital are 
important: we need to create understanding and bonds beyond those that we 
directly choose to interact with.  
The concept of informal social capital is closely related to what Putnam refers 
to as thin social capital: “almost invisible filaments of social capital, such as the 
nodding acquaintance you have with the person you occasionally see waiting in 
line at the supermarket, or even a chance encounter with another person in an 
elevator” (Putnam & Ross, 2002, p. 10). What makes voluntary civic 
organizations so powerful is that they (at least they used to) have the ability to 
create bridging social capital (social capital bridging geographical and 
socioeconomic divisions) and therefore develop the bonds that support a unified 
public sphere.  
A methodological reason for the focus on voluntary civic organizations is the 
ability to measure this kind of activity. It is harder to measure the spontaneous 
and/or non-organized interaction taking place in every day life. For example, 
David Ryfe (2002), when examining deliberation processes, focuses entirely on 
formal organizations with a specific purpose (like abortion or race) in which 
individuals self-select themselves. These kinds of formal organizations make it 
easier for the researcher to select a specific setting, but these settings also exclude 
those who do not actively seek a venue to deliberate about a specific issue, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
intellectual discussions are taking place and fails to fully recognize ‘ordinary’ 
social interaction as a part of the public sphere.       
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generally are a great majority of the population. Deliberation needs to be 
inclusive, which requires the inclusion of non-formal settings, in order to avoid a 
divide between the minority that has a great interest in a specific subject and the 
majority that does not. Ryfe (2002) claims that small groups tend to work better, 
from a deliberative perspective, since they “are by nature more intimate and 
informal. Organizations that work with very small groups stress the necessity of 
maintaining group cohesion through moderation, reciprocity, and reflection” (p. 
368). The best climate for deliberation therefore seems to be one in which people 
know and trust each other; where people dare to speak their mind and criticize 
other’s opinions. Formality tends to segregate people; make them pay more 
attention to the rules than to the content of the deliberation. We therefore should 
not ignore but rather actively explore the informal social interaction taking place 
in our daily lives when studying the impact of deliberation and social capital. 
Social Capital and Social Segregation    
Social capital is a product of societal integration; it requires that citizens work 
together to create and enforce communal norms. Trust, for example, would not 
develop unless norms exist that are respected in everyday actions. However, the 
development of social capital has to extend beyond the local community in order 
to build a strong and unified democracy capable of dealing with broader societal 
problems.  
Putnam (2000) recognizes that social capital in the U.S. is negatively correlated 
to economic inequalities. States with the highest levels of economic inequalities 
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(primarily in the South) also have the lowest levels of social capital, and the same 
states have historically experienced the highest levels of racial segregation. 
Gamarnikow and Green (2000) claim that social capital requires horizontal 
networks and relationships, and therefore works best in egalitarian communities. 
Those involved in specific networks tend to be from the same socioeconomic 
background and they learn to trust each other through a common understanding 
that other groups are not part of. Bellah (1996) relates to the same problem in his 
analysis of American individualism:     
Residential segregation is a fact of life in contemporary America. Even 
leaving aside the hypersegregation of urban ghettos, segregation by class 
arising from differential housing costs is becoming increasingly evident in 
suburban America. It is quite possible that in “getting involved” with one’s 
neighborhood or even with one’s suburban town one will never meet 
someone of a different race or class. One will not be exposed to the 
realities of life for people in circumstances different from one’s own. One 
may even succumb to the natural human temptation to think that people 
who are different, particularly those lower in social status, are inferior. The 
anxious class does not want itself to be confused with the underclass. One 
of the least pleasant characteristics of the over class, including its lower 
echelons in the educated upper middle class, is that they do not want to 
associate with middle Americans, with “Joe Six-Pack”, and others who 
lack the proper attributes. (p. xxiv) 
 
In fact, many academic scholars assume that different cultural norms and values 
exist in different communities; that we do not have a unified set of social capital 
in America. Alan Wolfe, for example, in his search for an American creed (1998), 
targeted specific middle-class communities in his research, assuming that one 
cannot find a unified creed by randomly selecting a sample that could include 
citizens from totally different socioeconomic conditions.  
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David Ryfe (2002) claims that future research on deliberation needs to address 
the question of whether deliberation produces better political outcomes. However, 
the answer to that question is dependent on the perspective and values that we 
base our evaluation upon. Frank Fisher (1987) refers to this problem with 
identification of values and definitions when discussing political policy 
evaluations:  
Although policy analysis had generally been identified as part of the 
Democratic Party’s approach to policy formation, particularly as 
manifested in the Great Society programs, conservatives recognized the 
necessity to develop and fund policy research suited to their own political 
needs. In sharp contrast to the use of policy analysis by liberal 
administrations to innovate new governmental programs, conservatives 
discovered the same empirical-analytical tools could be employed to 
eliminate public programs, often the very ones policy analysis had helped 
to create. (Fisher, 1987, p. 5)  
 
In other words, we can evaluate a specific policy from different perspectives 
based on different values and definitions and therefore receive different results. 
The process of evaluating policies therefore becomes more effective if we, as both 
Putnam and Habermas suggest, attempt to build inclusive communities in which 
people naturally interact and integrate (rather than segregate) and where they 
indirectly build common bonds, values, and definitions. 
The crucial issue regarding social capital in relation to deliberative democratic 
procedures is the quality (rather than the quantity) of the social capital. Robert 
Wuthnow found that the levels of social capital in the U.S. have remained rather 
steady for the last 50 years but the quality of the social capital has changed in a 
negative way:  
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With association levels and volunteering at comparatively high levels by 
cross-cultural standards, the United States may well have enough social 
capital left to function as a democracy with little loss of effectiveness. 
What kind of social capital is society able to create is probably the more 
important question. At present, significant attention in the United States 
needs to be devoted to creating social capital that does a better job of 
bridging between the privileged and the marginalized. (Wuthnow, 2002, p. 
102) 
 
Theda Scocpol (2002) describes a related trend when analyzing the scope of 
civic organizations. She describes old-fashioned cross-class membership 
federations (like the Elks, Veterans organizations, General Federation of 
Women’s Clubs, and PTA’s) as generally being racially exclusive and/or gender 
segregated. However, Scocpol claims that these organizations still were important 
to the creation of social capital: they attracted large amounts of people that often 
joined the organization for the basic purpose of socially interacting with other 
people. New civic organizations are increasingly advocacy oriented where 
members often share the same political interest but seldom meet to physically 
interact. A lot of the communication is now taking place over the Internet where 
the leaders of the organization ask the members for different forms of support.  
Scocpol, supported by the research of Verba et al. (1995) as well as Nie et al. 
(1996), claims that the new advocacy-oriented organizations are heavily 
dominated by the upper class, which have both the necessary financial resources 
and time resources to effectively take part in these types of activities. There are 




Ordinary citizens have fewer venues for membership in associations with 
real clout. Meanwhile, the most powerful Americans are interacting – and 
arguing – almost exclusively with one another. (Scocpol, 2002, p. 135) 
 
Formal organizations are of course not the only place in which this kind of 
social segregation is taking place at the expense of a unified social capital. 
William Julius Wilson (1996) and Jonathan Kozol (1991) have both examined the 
effects of the residential segregation taking place particularly in large cities: 
people from affluent suburb communities seldom interact with people from poor 
inner city areas. Michael Sandel (2002) uses the example of a sports arena to 
illustrate the same kind of segregation. Sandel describes how he used to go to 
Celtic’s games in Boston where he sat side-by-side and interacted with very 
affluent members of society as well as members of the blue-collar working class. 
That is all gone now when the new sports arenas have separate skyboxes, seats, 
food-venues, and even rest rooms for affluent spectators, leaving no room for any 
bridging social interaction.              
The main question for the evaluation of deliberative procedures should 
therefore be whether the deliberation helps bridge differences, whether 
deliberation could create more democratic decisions (than for example a simple 
shut-up-and-vote decision), and whether deliberation could inspire higher levels of 
political participation? These three questions are strongly interrelated; more 
democracy is generally a requirement for a better democracy, which also requires 
less segregation. The quality of the policy outcomes then has to be determined 
communally according to the common standards that develop in an inclusive 
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social interaction process rather than by any predetermined absolute standards 
identified by technocrats in the academic community. In other words, the only 
way to determine, in a democratic way, whether a decision is good or bad is to 
have as many citizens as possible involved in the process of determining the 
criteria for a good decision. This requires broad social interaction, including 
members of all socio-economic and ethnic groups. 
Leadership and Democratic Deliberation in Professional Organizations 
Robert Putnam, in his analysis of social capital in both Italy and the U.S., 
focuses on activities in voluntary organizations; he is interested in the 
organizational interaction in, for example, bird-watching clubs and bowling 
leagues. The role that leadership plays in organizations is widely debated and 
most likely varies with context. However, it is hard to fully ignore the impact of 
leadership in the process of building strong and democratic norms and other forms 
of social capital. The question is whether the leader, through his or her practices, 
supports inclusive, democratic ideals as well as communicates and interacts in a 
way that helps build strong and egalitarian social norms.  
Kenneth Thomas (1975) evaluates leadership based on how leaders score on 
scales for assertiveness and cooperation. (See figure 1, p. 53) Thomas claims that 
the aggregative leadership dimension ranges from competing (high on 
assertiveness and low on cooperation) to accommodating (low on assertiveness 
and high on cooperation). The competitive leader only cares about his or her 
individual interests; the accommodating leader will do whatever people want him 
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or her to do. The integrative leadership dimension ranges from avoiding (low on 
both assertiveness and cooperation) to collaborating (high on both assertiveness 
and cooperation). Someone who avoids leadership shows that he or she does not 
care about the collective outcome. The collaborating leader works towards an 
integration of different interests (the opposite of the competing leader who only 
tries to enhance his or her individual interests); he or she brings all members into 
the deliberative process in order to solve the problem in a way that satisfies all 
members of the organization. 
Figure 1.  Assertiveness and Cooperation in Leadership  
Assertiveness 
  Competing    Collaborating 
    
          Integrative leadership 
 
        Aggregative leadership 
         
  Avoiding    Accommodating 
        Cooperation 
        (From Thomas, 1975)  
Cindy Simon Rosenthal (1998) applies Thomas’s dimension when examining 
political leadership in state legislatures. Rosenthal claims that women more often 
than men try to collaborate in their political leadership; they are more likely to 
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listen and are more concerned about the well-being of all members of the 
organization. The organization from that perspective is more than a simple 
aggregation of individual interests. Men, on the other hand, are more likely to treat 
politics as a zero-sum game where you either win or lose and where it would be 
irrational not to take advantage of a leadership position in order to advance your 
own interests.  
The aggregated, competitive, zero-sum perspective of leadership makes sense 
from an exchange-theory perspective. There is no room for anything else but 
highly individualistic leadership behavior if government (as for example Locke 
and Friedman prescribe) should do nothing but secure the rules and outcomes of 
competition for scarce societal resources. There is no motive for the leader to 
encourage deliberation if the cultural values always assign a higher priority to 
individual competition than to common action and understanding – when the 
private always is more important than the communal. These differences in 
leadership styles between men and women reflect differences in our values and 
attitudes rather than structural arrangements or any kind of rational choice causes 
(see Burns, 2003). The political structure that male and female leaders act within 
is the same; we do not have separate legislative chambers for men and women. 
Men, from that perspective, seem to be more concerned about their own individual 
status while women seem to be more concerned about the creation of inclusive 
social bonds.    
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John Dewey (1997) claims that a democratic culture should reach far beyond 
large official decision-making institutions; that democracy relates to the everyday 
practices of social interaction. It should, as also prescribed by Stanley Deetz, go 
far beyond the definitions of democracy focusing on Election Day practices. 
One does not have to diminish the significance of elections in the least to 
still say that the focus on expression and election rather than on socially 
produced conceptions and decisions provides a remarkably narrow 
democracy. (Deetz, 1992, p. 46) 
 
Both Habermas’s and Putnam’s theories, as examined earlier, hold that 
effective democracy requires democratic social interaction at a micro level. It is 
hard to build a strong democracy if citizens do not conduct their daily interaction 
in a democratic manner. A strong and inclusive public sphere therefore relates to 
the interactions taking place far beyond the official legislative arena and voluntary 
organizations.23 People generally spend at least 40 hours of their week in a 
professional environment; a time that influences democratic norms and social 
capital as much as any other time of people’s lives.  
Deetz argues that corporations in many ways have become the new public 
sphere. It is the “corporate development of the obedient normalized mind and 
body” (Deetz, 1992, p. 58) that accounts for the largest threat to democracy in the 
private sphere. The privileged position of management in relation to the work-
                                                 
23 Dewey, for example, argues that the educational process is especially important 
when building a strong democratic culture. The way that children learn to relate to 
each other and their teachers affects the way they relate to each other in the public 
sphere as adults. Children who are socialized to apply a passive role in their 
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force not only allows for managerial absolutism but it also gives the manager 
power to define reason, meaning, language, and even the worker’s personal 
identity. In other words, the individual worker is stripped of his or her ability to 
autonomously define his or her own reality; he or she loses the most essential part 
of his or her freedom.  
Neo-capitalistic responses to the lack of democratic procedures in business 
organizations are often based on freedom of association and material 
compensation. The former is based on the assumption that a citizen has the right 
to join whatever organization he or she wants to; an argument that Deetz opposes: 
But in what ways is the modern employee meaningfully “free,” and where 
is the democracy this provides? The freedom is frequently reduced to the 
right to leave (assuming that is even realistic), but the right to leave does 
not make the workplace any more free or democratic for those who stay. 
(Deetz, 1992, p. 54) 
 
Employee stock options have increased during the last 20 to 30 years: workers 
are given a very limited financial ownership in the organization. But, these kinds 
of plans are often met with little enthusiasm since “employees do not see 
themselves as beneficiaries of these changes” (Butcher & Clark, 2002, p. 35). The 
fundamental problem with stock-option plans from a democratic perspective is 
that money cannot deliberate. The fact that an employee owns a microscopic 
proportion of a company does not mean that his or her needs and perspectives are 
automatically communicated to the management and the majority owner. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship with their teachers are likely to retain the passive role in future 
relationships with political authorities.  
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absoluteness in the world of management is still present regardless of whether an 
employee owns .001 or .02% of the stocks in a company.     
Another alternative to managerial absolutism24 is to give workers the ability to 
participate in decision-making procedures that not only impact what they do but 
also who they are. Anthony Giddens (1984) relates to this need in the terms of 
agency: the feeling that one has the ability to make a difference and therefore 
possesses some kind of control of his or her life. From that perspective, the main 
reason workers should be given a voice is not connected to benefits or other 
material issues; instead, workers’ participation is primarily an issue of giving the 
individual worker an ability to contribute and influence the practices that affect 
the way he or she lives his or her life. Deetz (1992) claims that organized laborers 
are just as guilty as their corporate management in applying a status-driven 
materialistic perspective; that issues concerning material benefits and power have 
received a higher priority than issues related to managerial domination and 
democratic practices. Unions as well as managements have been occupied with 
fights over benefits rather than ways of creating common understanding and 
reason within the organization. Communication has been used to win battles rather 
than to connect different perspectives. That is, status and temporal efficiency, 
rather then agency, appear to be the main driving forces in professional 
                                                 
24 Deetz uses the term managerialism: “a white, middle-class, male system” that 
“suppresses the conflicts within even white middle-class males, it transforms the 
interest and identities of groups in the society who initially were produced as its 
opposite (Deetz, 1992, p. 335).  
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organizations. Deliberation takes time and seldom results in material benefits or 
higher status.   
 
Time and Democracy in the Modern Society 
The two most dominating scales of the modern lifeworld (Leibenswelt) are 
money and time, both of which made Europeans become accustomed to 
using numbers and counting. More fundamentally to be able to count, to 
measure presumes a spatial mentality.  Measured time and value (money) 
are spatial constructs.  Space, time, and money are scalar phenomena. 
They are cultural artifacts and they have become the primary media for 
expressing the modern reality or manifold (in the Kantian sense).  Time, 
space, and money, as quantitative continua, are products of scaling in the 
interest of exactitude.  They are the languages moderns live by.  They are 
very useful for those who are obsessed with comparison and measuring 
variance (rates, masses, volumes).  
Eric Kramer, 2004, p. 49 
  
Robert Putnam (2000) claims that the time that people spend in front of the TV 
is time taken away from social activities that build social capital. However, TV is 
far from the only thing in society that has changed the way people interact. 
Buying consumer products in early 20th century America, for example, involved 
plenty of stops at different main-street businesses. Groceries were purchased in 
one store, tools in another, clothes in yet another and so forth. And the customer 
was always served by at least one employee in every store. There were coffee 
shops and other outlets between the stores in which people not only enjoyed 
something tasty but also interacted with other members of the community.  
Contemporary shopping in the same city is generally a totally different 
experience. People drive as close as they can to the entrance of a large 
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supermarket, they run around in the store to pick up everything they need, pay at a 
self-check-out station and leave the store without interacting with a single 
individual. Modern shopping is very representative of a modern culture in which 
the connection between time and money translates into efficiency.  
Wal-Mart, for example, is very efficient, and no time is wasted: everything is 
under one roof, so customers do not have to visit multiple stores; customers do not 
have to deal and interact with different employees; nor do customers sit and 
interact with other members of the community at the local coffee shop. All this 
“saved” time translates into saved money – a store with fewer employees is a store 
that can afford to sell their products for less while still making at least the same 
amount of money.  
Wal-Mart is not the only business that works with the assumption that less 
human interaction between customers and employees translates into more 
efficiency. A large part of the service industry, like banks, airlines, insurance, and 
telephone companies have machines (through internet or telephones) trying to 
conduct the services that used to be conducted by human beings. It is efficient 
since programmed machines are much less expensive than employees – that is, it 
is efficient according to the modern western standard of efficiency. From the same 
perspective, the ultimate efficient society would be one where citizens never have 
to interact with any other citizens: where all services are handled by machines and 
where we could do everything we need in our private environment at home.     
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However, that would also be a society without common reason, norms, and 
other forms of social capital that constitute the foundation of a strong democracy. 
There is no public sphere left – only an economically efficient, yet socially 
fragmented, group of consumers/workers. It is, for example, impossible to 
establish a common perspective and reason with a machine given that all 
definitions, criteria, categories, and critical assumptions are predetermined. A 
machine is therefore as undemocratic as it gets: it is always going to be the 
machine’s way since the machine simply cannot see things in a different way – 
there is no escape from discriminating assumptions and criteria.  
Ferdinand Tönnies (2001) would have found this pursuit of efficiency 
representative of what he called Gesellshaft society: a mechanical modern society 
aimed at material accumulation. The opposite side of Tönnies’ dichotomy is 
Gemainschaft: a community (rather than a society) in which everything, including 
individuals, is interconnected and where nothing exists outside the community. 
Gemainschaft was the predominant form of social organization in Europe, but the 
development of modern spatial ideas, starting with the Renaissance in Italy, led to 
a form of Capitalistic industrialization and eventually to the electronic information 
society. Property and labor were once regarded as essential parts of human 
survival yet communal in nature – now they are transformed into marketable 
commodities measured in money that in itself has no value to human survival 
(humans cannot eat money or use it as a direct tool). Art and culture used to be 
integrative parts of labor activities; they were part of the communities’ identity 
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and spiritual well-being. Art and culture in the modern society (Gesellschaft) are 
strictly separated from labor activities– they are now considered inefficient and 
are taken out of their natural contexts and instead appear as objects at museums 
and civic halls. All actions in Gesellschaft have instrumental motives – nothing is 
supposed to exist or happen on its own merits.25  
Most important for this essay is Tönnies’ analysis of reason in the modern 
society. A person in a community (Gemeinschaft) acted on a “natural will” geared 
toward communal harmony and understanding whereas a person in the modern 
civil society acts on a “rational will” geared at separation from the community. 
Tönnies defined the latter as artificial and sometimes even manipulative; rational 
calculations aimed at individual advancement are present in almost everything 
citizens do. The rational will, with its focus on individual advancement, is only 
possible through the quantification of objects into the concept of money. This 
constant pursuit of more financial resources is the driving force in society as later 
described in rational-choice theories: 
Every relationship in Gesellschaft represents the latent possibility of [the 
emergence of] an artificial superior person, who will have command over 
certain quota of means and resources; indeed Society itself is thought to 
need such a body in order to function as an effective whole. (Tönnies, 
2001, p. 186) 
 
Gebser (1985) builds on Tönnies’ argument and adds the component of quantified 
time. A person in the modern society is seeking instant gratification through 
collecting and comparing quantities of money which leads to impatience and a 
                                                 
TP
25 Tönnies was clearly influenced by Karl Marx’s sociological writings.  
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great interest in efficiency: a temporal anxiety. The issue of how much money you 
can make in a life-time became more important than the ability to enter heaven 
after death. Everything is quantified and in the center of the quantified world is 
the clock. The question is no more what a person could do to the community but 
rather how much gratification he could give himself by collecting quantifiable 
entities and most noticeably money. Individualism is from that perspective an 
extension of time and especially the temporal anxiety – it rests on the notion that 
my individual gratification is dependent on my efficient use of time. Civic 
engagement and politics is from the very same perspective inefficient unless it 
leads to direct quantifiable benefits. The end result is alienated individuals – the 
bonds between members of the community decreases when the individual seeks 
his own gratification through his own use of time. The communal group with 
strong bonds is replaced by an aggregated mass.   
The concept of reason has therefore shifted from the shared intersubjective 
practical reason (common sense) that existed in communities, to the many 
fragmented forms of reason that occur when citizens are expected to promote their 
individual versions of reason, a system where financial objects (money), rather 
than human subjects, do most of the interaction.26 Money cannot think and 
therefore participate in the process of defining communal reason, but that does not 
                                                 
26 Richard Sennett in the The Fall of the Public Man (1974) makes a similar 
argument claiming that 18th century villages/towns (before industrialization) were 
places where natural meaningful communication could take place in. 
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matter since quantitative competition is both more admirable and more time-
efficient than communal agreement in the modern western society.              
Tönnies made several trips to England to study the work of Thomas Hobbes but 
he was also well acquainted with Rousseau’s and Locke’s writings on the 
“natural” human state and will. I am not going to further speculate about the 
comparative accuracy of Tönnies’s, Hobbes’s, Locke’s, and Rousseau’s versions 
of the human nature, but Tönnies’s description of the human will in the modern 
civic society, of Gesellschaft, is very interesting. A modern individual is expected 
to seek separation from the community – he or she is supposed to be perceived as 
an individual object. Time urgency and obsession with efficiency turn everything 
into instruments. However, the individual citizen still has a desire to be recognized 
by the very community that he or she tries to separate from – a citizen’s status in 
society has replaced his or her communal identity.  
Status is essentially an extension of time; individuals are concerned about their 
place in present society but also in history. People want to be known, they want to 
be famous – they want an individual identity that stands out of the ordinary. The 
ordinary is linguistically related to the regular, the average, the most common, etc. 
For something to be ordinary requires that a majority of the cases/people fit into 
that specific categorization – a small minority can never create the ordinary. Yet, 
the term ordinary has a negative connotation in the modern western society; 
people do not like to be labeled ordinary or average – they would rather receive a 
label that indicates that they are different from the ordinary.  
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Kramer (2004) relates the modern fixation with status to the individualistic 
culture that experienced the Renaissance in 15th century Italy. We know, for 
example, little about specific individuals during the medieval period prior to the 
Renaissance; individual status appears to have had less importance in that culture: 
The modern use of fixed surnames for hereditary purposes started among 
the Venetian aristocracy and spread across Europe so that by 1450, most 
people regardless of social rank had a surname used for inheritance 
purposes.  Thus, the Modern ego extends itself beyond death to the next 
generation in the service of property. (p.16) 
    
Time and status often build on each other. Most college campuses, for 
example, are filled with stadiums, buildings, pathways, fountains, and even bricks 
that bear the names of individual financial donors who not only try to enhance 
their status in the current society but also secure it beyond their own lifespan. 
These forms of donations stand in at least partial conflict to democratic norms. 
The issue of where monetary donations are used most effectively is seldom settled 
through democratic deliberation because most donations are made with the 
purpose of creating an elevated status that lasts beyond the next academic year. 
There are, for example, relatively few financial donations for physical 
maintenance or academic advising even if a democratic deliberative process may 
identify these activities as having the greatest needs.  
Another example of the fusion between time and status in American society is 
the celebration of a single historic individual figure. Americans, for example, 
recognize George Washington and Martin Luther King, Jr. with federal holidays. 
However, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and John F. 
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Kennedy are other historical figures that are considered almost sacred in the 
American culture. This historical focus stands in contrast to the general 
assumption that Americans have a rather short memory. The glorification of 
distant historical figures is possible because of this short memory; some people 
tend to relate to these figures without considering any temporal contexts. They 
allow these historical figures to fit into a glorified role (without disturbing aspects 
such as slavery, adultery, and dictatorial practices) that comprises a very shallow 
common historical identity. In other words, most Americans do not identify 
themselves with the culture that they currently share but rather with the time and 
status that connect these historical figures. The values and norms that they 
celebrate are assumed to be absolute – they are symbols of historical figures and 
therefore hard to change. The glorification of these figures is essentially an 
attempt to shield values against the change that comes with trends spanning over 
time.  
Bill Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky shed light on Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s and John F. Kennedy’s numerous love affairs and effectively 
illustrated that what was a minor occurrence in the 1940’s or even in the 1960’s 
was definitely a big occurrence in the late 1990’s. Similarly, Ronald Reagan often 
hailed both Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy politically, for example, 
praising Kennedy’s tax-cuts. Reagan still failed to recognize that the contextual 
elements were different in the 1940’s, 1960’s, and the 1980’s.        
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Sweden, just like many other European countries, does not celebrate historical 
individuals in the same way. There is an annual formal recognition of Gustavus II 
Adolphus who successfully (from a strict military perspective) led the Swedish 
troops in the 17th century war between the Protestants and the Catholics in Europe. 
However, most Swedes (with the exception of a few neo-Nazis) do not identify 
themselves with Gustavus II Adolphus or any other historical leader (such as Karl 
XII); they consider these historical figures to be part of another time with different 
values and norms. In other words, these historical figures do not represent 
absolute and eternal values independent of time but rather historical 
representations of past values and norms. Sweden, in contrast to the U.S., was not 
founded on any eternal principles and values – current principles and values are 
instead a product of contemporary social interaction.   
Most holidays in Sweden therefore celebrate the Swedish culture in which 
traditional practices are connected with contemporary values and norms. A 
holiday from that perspective does not represent something eternal or absolute but 
rather the citizens’ involvement in the transformation of the current culture. 
Traditional Swedish holidays, such as Midsummer and Christmas, have little 
meaning unless most citizens attempt to recognize the current meaning of these 
holidays. From that perspective, time is relative whereas individual honor is 
secondary to the manifestation of a communal culture. It is hard to change what 
George Washington did but it is certainly possible to change contemporary 
cultural practices because they are dependent on the practices of those living in 
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society today. The former puts the public sphere in the passive position of 
admiring the past – the latter puts the public sphere in a more active autonomous 
position of defining what a holiday represents right now. The former connects the 
past with status in an absolute way – the latter allows the past to grow into the 
present.27
The notion that the past is different from the present does not mean that history 
is irrelevant. A person’s or a people’s heritage obviously has helped form who he, 
she, or they is or are and should not be ignored. The past still needs to be 
distinguished from the present and should not automatically be treated as if they 
are the same. Some of the jokes that were told 20 years ago are considered 
inappropriate today (sexist, racist, homophobic, etc.); our perceptions and values 
have changed. The awareness of these changes, of the trends that occur in our 
culture, is absolutely crucial to the understanding of who we are. It is in the same 
way important to know about our historical figures, what they did and stood for, 
but we must recognize that what was considered appropriate at that time may not 
be appropriate today. 
The connection between time and status could also appear in terms of temporal 
competition for status. One of the most discussed issues during the 2004 
presidential election campaign was CBS News’ report on President Bush’s 
National Guard record. All commercial media are concerned about their status in 
                                                 
27 It is important to recognize that the public sphere in Sweden does not have total 
autonomy in defining these holidays. Commercial interests clearly have a strong 
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relation to other news sources, and status is determined by viewer ratings. Time is 
crucial from this perspective: being the first news program to report on a story 
supposedly enhances the news station’s status. CBS News, in its eagerness to 
“break” a story about President Bush’s National Guard record, therefore set a 
higher priority to the timing of the story than to the accuracy of it (they did not 
adequately check their sources). CBS News therefore later had to admit that they 
had based the entire story on a fake document; the public was misinformed due to 
the station’s obsession with obtaining a greater status. Status and time, as 
described in the above examples, are often interconnected – the pursuit of status 
often requires attempts to control time. Time is therefore highly political in nature, 
but controlling for time is not always easy and seldom democratic. 
The connection between the past and the present is one dimension of time. 
Another temporal dimension with great political implications is quantity of time. 
Politics is often defined in terms of an organized conflict over or redistribution of 
scarce societal resources. We tend to identify political conflicts with material 
resources such as financial entitlements, with social values such as gay-marriage 
and abortion, or with international relations such as the “war on terror,” but we 
seldom identify time as the direct source of conflict. However, Robert Levine 
(1997) claims that one of the most common sources of conflict on a micro level; 
the politics between spouses, often relates to time. These are “questions as how to 
                                                                                                                                                 
voice in defining specific holiday practices.  
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spend their time, when to begin activities and when to go home, who is too fast, 
who is too slow, and must wait for whom” (p. 77). 
Time-efficiency, our desire to squeeze more time out of time, was the main 
concept behind Fredric Taylor’s investigations of how to create a more productive 
work force. Taylor’s practices “effectively” reduced the individual worker’s 
autonomy to nothing – they lost all the power over their own time. Workers are 
reduced to nothing but robots if they are forced to follow a schedule that dictates 
exactly how and when they should do specific things. Contemporary management 
still works under the assumption that there should be very little time for reflection 
and/or emotions; the work force has to be kept on track by a rigorous planning of 
time. 
Jeremy Rifkin (1987) predicts that many future political conflicts will involve 
interests of time: a “new temporal spectrum”. Just like spouses argue about their 
common use of time, we may, as a society, not only disagree about how to use our 
time but also on how we define it. Those aligned with power stress time-efficiency 
as a reason for preserving the current emphasis on material, industrial values; time 
is money and we have to be careful to not waste our time on “non-productive” 
activities. In opposition to this traditional time-frame stand those who argue that 
the traditional industrial perceptions of time are human artifacts; that we should be 
more conscious about how we relate to time and apply a more emphatic focus. 
“Politics, long viewed as a spatial science, is now also about to be considered as a 
temporal art” (Rifkin, 1987, p. 5). 
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Gebser (1985) claims that in the modern world humans have learned to control 
space but that we are struggling with the concept of time: 
As we approach the decline of the perspectival age, it is our anxiety about 
time that stands out as the dominant characteristic alongside ever more 
absurd obsession with space. It manifests itself in various ways, such as in 
our addiction to time. Everyone is out to “gain time,” although the time 
gained is usually the wrong kind: time that is transformed into a visible 
multiplication of spatially fragmented “activity,” or time that one has “to 
kill.” (p. 22) 
 
In other words, we treat time just like we treat space: we quantify it. The 
quantification is possible through the mechanical clock; the clock is telling us how 
“much” time we have available. However, we often treat the mechanical clock as 
if it (the clock) invented us and not the other way around; the mechanical clock 
has become our master.  
The Scarcity of Time 
Contemporary anxiety about time is manifest in our flight from it: in our 
haste and rush, and by our constant reiteration, “I have no time.” It is only 
too evident that we have space but no time; time has us because we are not 
yet aware of its entire reality. Contemporary man looks for time, albeit 
mostly in the wrong place despite, or indeed because of his lack of time: 
and this is precisely his tragedy, that he spatializes time and seeks to locate 
it “somewhere.  
Jean Gebser, 1985, p. 22 
 
Deliberation requires time; it is impossible to reach a well-deliberated decision 
if the decision has to happen right away. The absence of time for deliberation 
often leaves us stranded with a few unattractive options. We could always follow 
our emotions – our gut feelings. Related to this is the option of only considering 
our narrow self-interest; there is from that perspective no room for any 
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considerations regarding what is best from a communal perspective because the 
communal does not even exist. Another alternative is that people with authority 
are given monopoly over the time needed to decide upon an option – thus the 
public is only given one option because they do not have time to deliberate upon 
anything else. The perceived scarcities of time therefore tend to reduce the public 
to a powerless institution without the ability to scrutinize different options and 
thereby legitimize a specific decision. 
Habermas is critical of what are often referred to as public opinion polls, which 
in reality are often nothing but aggregated measurements of private opinions. The 
public is something communal – something shared. This does not mean that 
everybody has to have exactly the same opinion – only that a wide range of 
information, perspectives, and opinions have been shared and deliberated. Public 
opinions should be representative of a public sphere in which democratic 
deliberation takes place. However, the commercial media, who generally order 
“public opinion” polls, do not have time to wait for deliberation – they want to 
have their percentages right away, which therefore tend to be aggregated private 
opinions rather than a truly public opinion.  
David Ryfe (2002), when examining different deliberative organizations, found 
that this temporal anxiety is nothing unique for commercial media; participants in 
most organizations want to see “real” results soon. “Apparently, participants in 
deliberative groups believe that deliberation is useless unless it results in tangible 
change” and that the changes should have “observable effects on the community” 
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(p.366). Our culture promotes fast action, which often stands in opposition to 
time-consuming deliberation. We assume that there are quick “fixes” to all our 
problems. Deliberation, from that perspective, becomes goal oriented where the 
goal always is defined in terms of policies. Deliberation is also, according to the 
same perspective, generally not reflective. Deliberation about cultural changes, 
which takes time and is hard to observe, has to stand back to direct policy 
changes, which we can decide upon and officially “implement” right away. The 
long-term effects of a decision are, from that viewpoint, secondary to the results 
that we see the next month. 
The ability to control time also transforms into political power. Many 
politicians like to control the outcome, and controlling the agenda is the key to 
controlling the outcome. For example, in 2004 (after being reelected) President 
Bush invited prominent political and business leaders to discuss his economic 
agenda. However, Bush was not interested in deliberating with anyone with a 
different opinion; he only invited those who shared his views in order to 
effectively advance his own agenda.  
Early the next year, the Senate was asked to confirm President Bush’s choice 
for Secretary of State (Condoleezza Rice). The Republican majority in the Senate 
communicated strong opposition to any lengthy debate regarding the 
confirmation. Senate Democratic Minority Leader, Harry Reed, regarded the four 
hours that the Democrats had deliberated on the confirmation as very modest – 
considering that it involved the position of Secretary of State in a time of war and 
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with strained relations to our traditional international allies. Reed noted that four 
hours was less time spent on deliberation than most people spend deliberating on 
buying a car; Harry Reed also proclaimed that Shut Up and Vote is not 
democracy.  
President Bush and his political allies in Washington are hardly the first ones to 
set a higher priority to time constraints than to deliberative democratic procedures. 
Political representatives of both parties have set the same priority many times 
throughout history. Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, was often accused of 
pushing his New Deal policies through Congress without allowing for any lengthy 
debates (Wolf, 2001). Controlling the quantity of time is crucial to political power 
but it is also often detrimental to democratic ideals involving broad political 
participation. 
Non-western cultures may set different priorities to time and activities. They 
may, for example, care more about the actual social event than the actual material 
outcome of the event: 
In my travels in South America and Asia I have repeatedly been confused, 
and sometimes even harassed, by comments such as: “Unlike you 
Americans, time is not money for us.” My usual response is something 
like: “But our time is all we have. It is our most valuable, our only really 
valuable, possession. How can you waste it like that?” Their typical retort – 
usually in a less frantic tone than my own – begins with unqualified 
agreement that time is, indeed, our most valuable commodity, but it is for 
exactly this reason, event timers argue, that time shouldn’t be wasted by 
carving it into inorganic monetary units. (Levine, 1997,   p. 90) 
     
The low priority given to deliberation is clearly detrimental to democratic 
ideals, but an even larger problem is the low priority given to the social activities 
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that build social capital and a democratic culture. The higher priority assigned to 
separation (in contrast to integration) of human communities in the modern 
western culture negatively affects our ability to build and maintain social bonds 
and other forms of social capital. Graduate students, for example, are expected to 
spend more time working on academic activities then on social activities – they 
are expected to spend more time in front of their computers than with their 
families, friends, and neighbors. They are also expected to sacrifice their social 
bonds, their connection with the community, and move to a new place once they 
have finished their degree. The reason for this is the same as for most other well-
educated individuals; the individual career that creates status and material wealth 
is supposed to be more important than communal cohesion, social bonds, and 
other forms of social capital. Graduate students are expected to be individualistic 
in the narrowest sense when making decisions regarding their future; as if 
communal and non-materialistic concerns are irrelevant. Geoffrey Goodbye 
claims that we have become walking résumés: “If you are not doing something 
you are not creating and defining who you are” (Schor, 1991, p. 23).        
Directing time 
A further expression of man’s current helplessness in the face of time is his 
compulsion to “fill” time; he regards it as something empty and spatial like 
a bucket or container devoid of any qualitative character. But time is in 
itself fulfilled and not something that has be “filled up” or filled out.  
Jean Gebser, 1985, p. 22 
 
Another way to exercise political power is to control the use of time; how we 
schedule our activities. It is generally assumed that the most important issues 
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should be dealt with first; leaving less important issues further down on the 
agenda. The way we schedule not only our political activities but also our 
everyday activities therefore has a major impact on our lives. We live in a society 
in which it is commonly expected that we adjust our lives to a small human 
artifact (the mechanical clock) disregarding that each mechanical clock has to be 
set by ourselves or other human beings. For example, an Italian professor during 
the early Renaissance decided that he was going to eat lunch at 12:00 pm every 
day, so he simply adjusted his own clock to 12:00 when he felt like it was time to 
have lunch. This professor clearly realized what most of us never even would 
consider: that we are the master of the clock and not the other way around.  
The Nuers live in a culture distinct from the western modern culture and they 
treat time in a different way: they decide upon when their different seasons arrive 
according to when they start a specific project. In other words, they do not allow 
an artificial calendar to dictate their seasons – they instead dictate when their 
seasons start and end. Kur, which is the season when they do a lot of construction 
work, starts when they start doing a lot of construction work. Dwat, which is the 
time when they break their camps, starts when they start breaking their camps 
(Lauer, 1981).   
Some political movements, in their attempts to radically change society, have 
recognized the power of the perception of time. The revolutionaries in France at 
the end of the 18th century and the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union both attempted 
to exchange the traditional Gregorian calendar for a new secular calendar 
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independent of Christian teachings. The revolutionaries in France introduced a 
ten-day week, including one day of rest. Stalin was easier on the labor force when 
he introduced a five-day week that also included one day of rest. The French 
revolutionaries even introduced a ten-hour day (instead of 24 hours) trying to 
“rationally” fit the measurement of time into the metric system. The motive 
behind all of these changes was to achieve control over the collective; the ways 
that people interact in a community (Levine, 1997). Needless to say, these 
attempts to change the traditional social constructions of time failed, effectively 
showing that what humans consider “natural” ultimately is a product of communal 
understanding and repetition rather than cognitive impositions. The intersubjective 
scale of time is much more important than any “natural” or “rational” 
quantification of time.        
The introduction of cable TV networks providing us with “news” 24/7 is typical 
of modern media acting under the constraints of time-efficiency. They, for 
example, order “public opinion” polls in order to be able to present the polls when 
the regular news flow is expected to be low. News organizations have to fill their 
airtime or newspapers with a constant amount of news, and the easiest way to do 
so is to plan for pseudo news instead of waiting for the actual news to happen. 
That is, the importance of the actual news is less important than the ability to 
timely plan the news.  
An example of this was the reporting on the Tsunami disaster in South East 
Asia in 2004. The Tsunami happened late in the evening (Eastern American time) 
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on Saturday December 25th and the word of the disaster had reached every major 
news organization early Sunday morning. However, the major news providers, 
such as CNN who are supposed to report on “news” 24 hours a day, gave the 
Tsunami disaster little attention that Sunday. CNN ran Sunday news magazines 
with minor news briefs headed by reports from professional football games – 
content that was planned ahead of time. It did not seem to matter that this was a 
major disaster that later qualified for enormous amounts of coverage: news was 
not supposed to happen without prior notification and especially not the Sunday 
after Christmas. The same problem could be related to what Waller et al. (2001) 
describe in terms of temporal urgency; a preoccupation with rigorous scheduling 
and deadlines. Many news organizations’ obsession with efficiently controlling 
time through rigorous planning of every event makes the news organizations do 
exactly the opposite of what they claim they do. The reporting on actual news 
events (in contrast to planned pseudo events28) therefore often delays the public’s 
ability to determine a reasonable response to problems in a timely manner.    
Politicians also tend to focus a lot of attention on the timing of the political 
events that they “control.” Politicians know when people are paying attention to 
news media, which usually is at the same time as when journalists expect things to 
happen. “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in 
August,” said White House chief of staff Andrew Card in reference to the timing 
                                                 
28 See Daniel Boorstin’s discussion on pseudu-events in The Image or What 
Happened to the American Dream (1962).  
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of the White House’s serious push for a war in Iraq. The White House knew that 
the “war on terrorism” (which the war in Iraq was framed as) was a favorable 
issue for President Bush and therefore should be introduced when it had the 
opportunity to generate the most attention. August, a month when many 
Americans were on vacations, was not a good time to push for a war in Iraq. The 
President instead wanted the message to reach the public before the November 
congressional election and September was therefore the natural time to seriously 
introduce the issue to the American public (Schneider, 2002).   
Timing is, from this perspective, crucial; a politician wants to use his or her 
time so that he or she receives the maximum benefit from every policy incentive. 
This often requires the planning of pseudo-events in order to have maximum 
control over the outcome of the event. Actual events are problematic because they 
are hard to control. Planned pseudo-events, on the other hand, could be produced 
in a way that they generate the intended positive effects – they establish the 
“truth” in a favorable way. Yet what may be favorable to an individual trying to 
control time is unfavorable to a public trying to establish what constitutes a 
problem and truth in a democratic way.   
Holding on to Time 
Albert Einstein began a paradigm shift in physics with his exploration of time-
relativity. Einstein’s discovery that time physically runs at a different speed at 
different places was new to the hard sciences but still an extension of the 
relativism expressed by scholars like Aristotle, Kant, and Heidegger. Einstein 
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essentially claimed that time is not absolute – that it is dependent on the different 
contextual aspects as well as the perspective a person brings to the context: 
When you sit with a nice girl for two hours, it seems like two minutes; 
when you sit on a hot stove for two minutes, it seems like two hours. That’s 
relativity. (Einstein as cited in Levine, 1997, p. 26) 
 
The relativism of time may be one of our largest hurdles when trying to apply 
deliberative democracy based on reason. One of Habermas’s elements of the ideal 
speech situation states that arguments based on tradition need to be exposed. The 
autonomy of the public sphere and its ability to democratically determine reason is 
reduced by references to traditions. Traditions are generally based on what was 
considered good reason in the past but reason, just like everything else, changes 
with time. People experience new things; they are exposed to new perspectives 
and therefore receive a new understanding of the world that surrounds them.  
Time therefore tends to create complexity and dissonance instead of the 
uniformity and clarity that modern society proscribes. Our current perception of 
time essentially allows us to either retrospectively impose our current reason to a 
specific situation, or accept that the reason that we agree upon has to be relative, 
which creates complexity in the implementation of policies. In other words, we 
cannot claim that the reasoning we want to apply is absolute without violating the 
legal norm that states that we should not retrospectively judge past actions. 
This problem was illustrated in the example from the Olympic Games in 
Athens as described earlier in this essay. Parts of the American public wanted the 
FCC to enforce an absolute standard limiting nudity. However, is it really possible 
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to apply this absolute standard to people and actions in the past (or in other 
cultures) that do not share the same reason and norms? A common attempt to 
“solve” this problem is to presuppose value neutrality. The idea of value neutrality 
is based on the assumption that an objective foundation exists to every issue – that 
there is something that is free from individual subjective interpretations. This is, 
of course, impossible; how can we make sense of something if we are not allowed 
to relate to prior experiences and perspectives?  
Contract theories attempt to create a system that overcomes temporal 
complexity. A system is assumed to be fair and democratic as long as it holds onto 
some predetermined set of rules no matter how old or outdated these rules are. 
The U.S. constitution (decided upon in the late 18th century) is by many assumed 
to be the guarantee for democracy in America. It does not matter how 
undemocratic the contemporary society turns out to be; the fact that each person, 
supposedly, knows the rules and is able to play according to them is assumed to 
make the system democratic. In fact, changing the rules would, from that 
perspective, be undemocratic since it violates the rules that were set up to make 
society democratic in the first place.  
Both Robert Nozick (1974) and John Rawls (1999), in their definitions of 
justice of a fair society, work with the same prospective perspective; they both 
assume that a fair society is identified by the rules we set up ahead of time. 
Nozick is straightforward in his approach; the only thing that matters is whether a 
person has the same theoretical ability to compete for scarce societal resources. 
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There is, for example, nothing in the written constitution that theoretically stops a 
poor inner-city girl from becoming a billionaire. Rawls, on the other hand, argues 
that fairness ought to be determined through a “veil of ignorance”29; that we could 
agree upon what constitutes a fair society if all of us hypothetically entered 
society with no knowledge about how we might fare in the societal competition 
for scarce societal resources. Rawls assumes that people acting under the “veil of 
ignorance” would create a system that prevents people from gaining practical 
advantages – it should not matter whether your parents are billionaires or welfare 
recipients.  
However, Rawls and Nozick’s theories share the same modern western 
assumption that citizens compete for strategic advantages and that the outcome of 
the competition is justified through the rules that were set prior to the competition. 
Stanley Deetz disagrees and claims that democracy is an “ongoing 
accomplishment” that requires a balanced conflict where nobody has a 
predetermined upper hand. He refers to Gilligan’s description of young girls 
playing games: 
She [Gilligan (1982)] describes their play as a balance of competition and 
facilitation. They played to win as part of the logic of the game itself. But 
they also played to learn and help the other learn, and importantly to keep 
the game going and interesting. If the rules disadvantaged one player, they 
changed the rules. The game even became more fun to play. (Deetz, 1992, 
p. 338) 
                                                 
29 The veil of ignorance is a condition in which a citizen has no knowledge about 
his own conditions. That would, according to Rawls, make people chose societal 
arrangements that are fair to everyone since it is impossible to strategically favor 




In other words, the issue is whether the purpose of the game is supposed to be 
legitimate status separation or democratic interaction? The idea that democracy, 
fairness, or justice, is determined in the present and not in the past is foreign to the 
modern (male-dominated) western culture. The current prospective (rule of law) 
perspective is based on the assumption that competition and communication are a 
means for status separation. A perspective defining fairness and justice in the 
present is based on the assumption that competition and communication are a 
means for social interaction.  
Both Rawls and Nozick seem to perceive competition as “natural” and therefore 
value neutral, but it could just as well be an issue of familiarity. I may, for 
example, find competition between individuals very familiar after being 
encouraged to compete against my fellow students during my entire time in the 
educational system. However, just because something has been encouraged and 
become familiar does not mean that it is value neutral; it simply means that I have 
been cultivated some specific values.  
Therefore both the idea of value neutrality and predetermined rules work with 
the assumption that temporal concerns do not matter. There are no trends, 
developments, or contexts that can change the natural superiority of these 
procedures; anything “natural” is absolute in reference to time and culture. This 
effectively reduces the need for deliberation; people are effectively told that there 
is no need to deliberate about anything that is based on these “neutral” or 
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predetermined values. Everything is supposed to be democratic as long as the 
rules appear to be “neutral” and do not prospectively favor anyone. Democracy is 
from that perspective supposedly independent of attitudes and motives and it is 
especially independent of the societal trends that take place over time. The end 
result is a limited scope of democratic deliberation; traditions, as represented in 
the ideas of value neutrality and predetermined rules for competition, reduce the 
ability to identify common reason. Communication is unnecessary because past 
reason is extended to current reason. The autonomy of the public sphere is 
reduced by our attempts to hold onto time as though our perception of the world is 
constant. 
Time Transformed into Status 
In a hierarchical time culture, status is often delineated in terms of how 
valuable a person’s time is. The time poor are made to wait, while the 
temporally privileged are waited upon. Material compensation is less 
determined by work accomplished than by the notion that some people’s 
time is more valuable than others’ and therefore worth of greater 
remuneration.  
Political tyranny in every culture begins by devaluing the time of others. 
Indeed, the exploitation of human beings is only possible in pyramidal time 
cultures, where rulership is always based on the proposition that some 
people’s time is more valuable and other people’s time more expendable.  
Jeremy Rifkin, 1997, pp. 196-197 
 
The disrespect of other people’s time is a result of status differences. Status is 
based on past accomplishments, or could even be inherited from earlier 
generations, which gives a person an elevated position (higher authority) in a 
speech situation independent of the quality of her actual arguments. This could 
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potentially also “save” time, a reference to authority is generally less time-
consuming then the presentation of a logical argument.      
The status of the chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, is an 
American example of how status affects democratic activities. Greenspan’s word 
is not only often treated as absolute but is often treated as praxis when in reality it 
is nothing but techne. Very few people in the political arena dare to question what 
Greenspan says – his opinions about economic policy are regarded as the ultimate 
judgment. The public sphere often looses its ability to choose between different 
alternatives when Greenspan already has determined the “best” solution.     
Status is also very important in political campaigns. The 2004 presidential 
election debate, for example, was regulated by 37 pages of rules dictating what the 
two candidates could say and not say, how the candidates should stand/sit, what 
the cameras could show, and so on. Representatives for both candidates carefully 
negotiated these regulations with one single purpose in mind: to win/not loose the 
debate. Each candidate participated in days of debate preparations aimed at 
making sure that they had a prepared standardized answer to every possible 
question and that they always stayed “on message.” 
Representatives for media complained about how these rules and standardized 
messages were detrimental to the purpose of a debate. However, most media 
coverage ultimately shared the same focus: the competitive aspects of the debates. 
The pre and post debate coverage featured very few substantive discussions 
regarding important societal problems: the focus was almost entirely on how the 
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debate could influence a candidate’s status in the polls and ultimately his ability to 
win the election. Spinners from both parties were given plenty of time to preview 
and review the debate in the most favorable way to their candidate independent of 
any substantive reality. 
In other words, neither the media nor the candidates were interested in any 
deliberation with the purpose of dialectically determining what constitutes good 
policies and reason. The candidates probably had no intention of ever admitting 
that their policy was substantively inferior to the policy of their opponent or of 
debating the strengths and weaknesses of the original positions to create new 
policies. In fact, candidates generally purposely propose policies vague enough to 
make it almost impossible to engage in any dialectical deliberation. Media also 
lack any interest in time-consuming deliberation30; they prefer short statements 
with constant turn-taking reinforcing the competitive aspect of the debate.  
Robert Bellah (1996) describes how talk radio represents an extreme version of 
politics; it “mobilizes private opinion, not public opinion, and trades on anxiety, 
anger, and distrust, all of which are deadly to a civic culture” (p. xvii). The end 
game for many talk radio hosts is to defeat and trash the political opponent in 
order to place themselves ahead of their colleague or any other person willing to 
voice an opinion. There are few, if any, efforts wasted on identifying good reason 
                                                 
30 The average presidential election coverage sound-bite on the network evening 
news has decreased from more than 30 seconds in the 1960’s to less than 10 
seconds in 2000.  
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or even the truth. The competitive status of the talk radio hosts seems to be the top 
priority – they represent a modern version of sophistry.  
Another example of the pursuit of status at the expense of deliberation within 
media was revealed in January 2005. Armstrong Williams and Maggie Gallagher, 
both conservative media commentators, admitted that they had been paid by the 
Bush administration to endorse specific issues on the President’s agenda. 
Armstrong accepted $240,000 from the Department of Education to promote 
Bush’s No Child Left Behind initiative (Keen & Drinkard, 2005). These kinds of 
transactions are illegal since they are considered to be governmentally sponsored 
propaganda. However, Williams’s and Gallagher’s acceptance of money in 
exchange for media “favors” also speaks to their priority of values: the money that 
they received was apparently more important to them than the quality and 
integrity of their voice in the democratic deliberative process. 
Political figures in the nation’s capital are not the only ones setting a higher 
priority to their own status than to the quality and integrity of the deliberative 
process. The politics taking place at a local level may be just as selfish and 
“dirty”. George Skinner, a County Commissioner in Oklahoma, is probably not 
the only politician to change his party affiliation in order to become more 
attractive to his constituency, although all politicians may not be as blunt about it. 
Skinner claimed during his reelection campaign that he better-represented the 
majority of the voters in his district after switching his registration from Democrat 
to Republican (Turk, 2004). In other words, Skinner set a higher priority to his 
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ability to get reelected (his status as a politician) than to any substantive political 
ideals.  
Mathews (1996) also describes the American society and especially the 
political culture as a competition where communication is used for manipulation 
rather than building understanding: 
We’re organized into interest groups which compete with one another in a 
political arena that is like a marketplace with all kinds of competition and 
transactions. Some of the interest groups are able to amass a majority and 
get legislation passed and candidates elected because of their skill in 
manipulating the public and the media. The function of government is to 
adjudicate this competition and distribute resources as dictated by the 
outcomes. (Mathews, 1996, p. 283) 
  
 This competitive perspective of politics and democracy is generally taken 
for granted in the academic research in which scholars work with the assumption 
that politics and democracy is all about advancing individual interest. Many 
political communication scholars evaluate different strategies for advancing 
specific arguments and agendas without any consideration regarding what 
constitutes the common good.31 The dominant perspective of communication, 
from this perspective, is one concerned with instrumental effectiveness rather than 
broad participation (Deetz, 1992). That is, we are more concerned with our ability 
to accomplish (control) specific ends rather than the formation of collective 
meaning and decisions.  
                                                 
31 This competitive perspective of political communication is prevalent in Trent 
and Friedenberg’s book Political Campaign Communication. Principles and 
Practices (2000), which is used in many undergraduate political communication 
classes.   
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Deetz relates this to the enlightenment process and especially the French and 
American Revolutions in which the transcendent switched from the “truth and 
nature of the world” to the “nature and rights of the individual to use reason to 
reach a rather than the truth” (p. 97). Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1991) is often credited 
as an early influence towards this emphasis on effectiveness in communication, 
but this is a notion that Deetz disagrees with: 
This recurring view often forgets to mention that the Greek conception of 
effectiveness presumed a model of participation to be already in place. We 
don’t have to be too charitable to Aristotle or overly simplistic to suggest 
that, even at this late stage in Athenian democracy, training in rhetoric was 
not primarily to give one an advantage over others, as perhaps Plato’s view 
of the Sophists suggests. The point was to enable all citizens (from which 
they excluded women and slaves) to contribute effectively within the 
public forum to enable truth itself to emerge. In this sense rhetoric was 
intended to be in support of the dialectic of truth, not in opposition of it. 
(Deetz, 1992, p. 95) 
 
In fact, a private person who tried to separate himself or herself from the 
community was regarded as strange or even stupid in the ancient Greek culture. A 
Private person is the Greek term for a non-citizen; it is someone who lacks a 
home – which was the same as an idiot (Deetz, 1992). Or, as Aristotle described it 
in Politics: “The man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of 
political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient, 
is not part of the polis, and therefore must be either a beast or a god” (In Deetz, 
1992,  p. 154).    
Successful modern political communication, on the other hand, is often defined 
in terms of the ability to influence a citizen to vote for a specific candidate or even 
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not to vote for the opposing candidate. A candidate’s ability to influence simply 
makes the influence legitimate. Yet, neutrality and objectivity are still generally 
expected when academic scholars examine political messages, assuming that one 
neutral reality actually exists. Academic scholars attempting to be ‘neutral’ or 
‘objective’ in their analysis therefore indirectly support the notion that might 
makes right; that political communication is independent of reason and communal 
needs. Paul Lazersfeld (1941) was an early pioneer in separating the effects of a 
message from broader social values; numbers were supposed to be objective and 
independent of philosophical considerations. Academic scholars who, in that way, 
treat techne as praxis or even virtue in their analysis are essentially legitimizing 
modern sophistry by avoiding the motives that guide the action.    
This academic neo-Aristotelian perspective of truth and reason is sometimes 
extended to the most un-liberal political movements. That is, political movements 
that have little tolerance for alternative opinions utilize the liberal idea that all 
truth and reason are relative. One of the most frightening examples of this was 
Joseph Goebbles’ mass communication machine in Nazi Germany. Goebbles (the 
Minister of Propaganda) demonstrated little respect for common reason; 
communication was, from his perspective, an effective tool in moving public 
opinion in a favorable direction without any concerns for generally accepted 
social constructions:  
It would not be impossible to prove with sufficient repetition and 
psychological understanding of the people concerned that a square is in fact 
a circle. What after all are a square and a circle? They are mere words and 
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words can be moulded until they clothe ideas in disguise. (Goebbles as 
cited in Pratkanis & Aronson 1991, p. 49) 
    
Still, Goebbles’ Nazi regime did not allow any alternative interpretations of 
symbols once they had defined all symbols in a way that fit their interests. 
Meaning and truth were relative to Goebbles in the pre-Nazi era, but they became 
very absolute once the Nazis were in power. 
However, the willingness to force absolute perspectives and truths on the 
people is not exclusive to what is referred to as totalitarian32 regimes. Plenty of 
research (Button & Mattson, 1999, & Kimmelman & Hall, 1997) on deliberation 
confirms the negative impact that status has on deliberation and stake-hold. 
Politicians with a higher status and “regular” citizens generally do not deliberate 
effectively together: 
Politicians prefer to assume the role of experts in the political process and 
seek to educate participants into the logic of group politics. And 
participants feel that they do not know enough about the relevant issues to 
engage with representatives as equals. The result is a teacher-pupil form of 
exchange that rarely moves beyond a question-answer session. Moreover, 
when more sustained conversations are achieved, they may end in breeding 
more public cynicism. (Ryfe, 2002, p. 369) 
 
Ryfe’s description of status recognition in this kind of meetings is an 
environment in which all elements of Habermas’s Ideal Speech Situation are 
violated: ideas are not freely expressed and examined (because the politicians do 
not get a chance to examine the ideas of the citizens); politicians are using their 
                                                 
32 Anyone trying to receive absolute control over the society has to control 
communication. However, are attempts to control communicative entities like 
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own status to strengthen their arguments; politicians indirectly use traditions as 
the base for the arguments (when referring to the “logic of group politics”); and 
the truth is often imposed by the politicians rather than achieved through 
consensus building.  
References to status in a speech situation are sometimes officially established 
before the speech situation even takes place. A campus newspaper advertisement 
regarding a university-sponsored political event featured the following: 
Your Are Invited 
Panel Discussion 
“Republican Leadership of the U.S. House and Senate” 
Featuring 
The Honorable Tom Cole 
The Honorable Don Nickles 
The Honorable Guy Vander Jagt 
 
Luncheon Address 
“Leading the House Republicans” 
Featuring the Honorable Dick Armey 
The label honorable indicates that these guests should be recognized with a 
high social status. Labels, like honorable, are different from positional titles like 
President; a title informs about a position that may be relevant in a speech 
situation. A President should be held to the same standards of reason in his or her 
arguments as all other citizens, but the title still informs about that specific 
person’s background and perspective. The label honorable does not necessarily 
indicate any perspective that may be relevant to the speech situation; it only 
                                                                                                                                                 
meaning and the truth totalitarian in nature? A confirmative answer to that 
question would effectively put a totalitarian label on many politicians.  
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indicates that someone ought to have an elevated status in the specific speech 
situation. That is, this person may receive more time to present his or her 
argument and the arguments may not receive the usual scrutiny. The use of status 
labels would therefore be an obstruction to the process of democratically 
identifying reason in a speech situation. People attending this specific event on 
congressional politics benefit from knowing that both Don Nickles and Dick 
Armey have played major roles in the U.S. Congress and that Tom Cole is a 
current member of the House of Representatives (which the ad does not say), but 
do people who attend this event really benefit from being told that these men are 
honorable? The use of labels may primarily be based because of tradition or it 
may be an attempt to create a glamorous atmosphere. However, glamour and 
traditions do not extend into rational and logical reason; they are instead a 
distraction from reason because they generally generate an emotional rather than 
cognitive reaction. 
The categorization of people sometimes has more democratic intentions as 
exemplified by the discussion over differences between male and female brain 
activity. Scientists have found that men’s and women’s brains function differently, 
and that boys and girls therefore face different educational challenges. Therefore, 
some scholars claim that boys and girls should be separated and receive different 
educations since it would be more “productive” to society if we customize the 
education according to their different needs. Another argument for this kind of 
gender separation is that society needs to cognitively educate boys and girls 
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differently so that the educational process does not favor one gender over the 
other.  
Both those arguments are based on competitive concerns. The first argument 
assumes that a more productive society is a better society – that we become 
happier simply because we know more. The other argument assumes that 
education should primarily prepare the individual citizen for future competition. 
The latter is therefore an egalitarian argument in the sense that it aims at creating a 
leveled playing field between men and women in the competition for material 
resources. However, is it really better for democracy if we educate our children 
towards the purpose of competition rather than cooperation? Also, do we really do 
democracy a favor when we separate boys from girls and therefore add to the 
difficulties of creating common understanding, reason, and social capital? These 
types of questions reflect the differences between a democracy based on equal 
competition and a democracy based on equal cooperation.  
The modern western culture is generally geared towards competition for social 
status as exemplified by Bill Clinton commenting on his impending surgery in 
March 2005. “I’ve had an unusual life. If something happens – If I get struck by 
lightning on the golf course today – I’d wind up ahead of where 99.99 percent of 
the people that ever lived” (The Norman Transcript, 2005, p. A12). In other 
words, the former president does not determine the quality of his life based on any 
references to health or social relationships but rather in reference to the relative 
status of his career accomplishments. 
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Societal status is often communicated through material objects that are an 
extension of the past as described by Martin Buber:  
In so far as man rests satisfied with the things that he experiences and uses, 
he lives in the past, and his moment has no present content. He has nothing 
but objects. But objects subsist in time that has been.  
The present is not fugitive and transient, but continually present and 
enduring. The object is not duration, but cessation, suspension, a breaking 
off and cutting clear and hardening, absence of relation and of present 
being.  
True being is lived in the present, the life of objects is in the past. (Buber, 
1958,  p. 12-13.) 
   
Buber claims that it is impossible to disconnect oneself from the community – 
what he describes as the thou. We do not achieve self-actualization by trying to 
separate ourselves from the public sphere and the community. Self-actualization 
has to be based on social relationships; on how we relate to the thou of our lives 
rather than material quantifications and social separation. However, the modern 
western culture, with its constant emphasis on consumption and comparisons of 
material entities, creates an environment in which status, defined in terms of 
separation, becomes highly prevalent.          
The notion that time is money is representative of a society in which everything 
is measured and ultimately transformed into a unit that allows us to exchange 
values according to the same scale (money). Max Weber (1957) relates to this 
notion when describing the differences between the Catholics and the Protestants 
in 19th century Europe. Weber cites Benjamin Franklin when describing the work 
ethic of the Protestants: 
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Remember, that time is money. He that can earn the shillings a day by his 
labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he spends 
but six pence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon that the 
only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings 
besides. (Franklin in Weber, 1957, p. 48) 
 
President Clinton, in his 1994 State of the Union Address, raised his concern 
with the relative competitiveness of the American workforce. Clinton claimed that 
“we measure every school by one high standard: Are our children learning what 
they need to know to compete and win in the global economy.” Astin (2002) 
defines this in the terms of a “pegboard view” in which “the role of higher 
education is to produce the right-shaped people – the “pegs” – who will fill these 
[industrial job-] slots” (p. 93). Astin claims that there is nothing wrong with 
educating citizens that do well in an industrial competitive market, the problem is 
that the competitiveness in the international market place only has a marginal 
impact on many contemporary social problems.  
Some scholars and politicians therefore question the usefulness of the GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) and other competitive rankings. The New Economics 
Foundation (based in London) claims that economic values, as measured in GDP, 
do not equal life satisfaction (Time Magazine, 2005). For example, are people 
necessarily happy when they have to work 50 hours a week in order to pay for 
what are considered necessities within their society? The combination of many 
work hours and high price levels in a country create a “high” GDP ranking, but 
what is that ranking worth if the citizens do not have the time to enjoy their 
material “necessities” or even the company of their family members or friends?  
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Jigme Singye Wangchuck raised the same issue when he was crowned king of 
Bhutan in 1972. Wangchuck argued that his country had a low GDP but a high 
GNH, Gross National Happiness. He further argued that the people of Bhutan 
would remain happy if the country focused on economic self-reliance, a pristine 
environment, preserving and promoting the domestic culture, and democratic 
governance (Time Magazine, 2005). However, King Wangchuck’s ideas 
obviously did not take root in the modern western culture in which better 
generally is defined as more.  
The most extreme version of exchange theory works with the assumption that 
all the products or services people pursue have practical utility. That is, people 
pursue more materials in order to make their lives easier. Juliet Schor (1991) 
describes how Americans work more and more in order to increase their 
consumption. However, the desire to buy more products is primarily a function of 
trying to keep up with your neighbor – material competition forms the modern 
identity: the reality is that you are poor. “Consumerism is not an ahistorical trait 
of human nature, but a specific product of capitalism . . . the organized creation of 
dissatisfaction” (Schor, 1991, pp. 117-122).  
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In other words, our constant pursuit of more material does not necessarily make us 
happier; we simply act out of a fear of having less than our neighbor, of constantly 
being reminded about our relative material shortcomings.33  
The more of our happiness we derive from comparisons with others, the 
less additional welfare we get from general increases in income – which is 
probably why happiness has failed to keep up with economic growth. 
(Schor, 1991, p. 123) 
  
We are in a sense in a prisoners’ dilemma: we do not dare take the chance of 
working and consuming less because of the consequences it would have on our 
socially constructed identity. Only communication can take us out of that 
dilemma. We can only approach the problems related to status competition if we 
communicate in order to reduce the uncertainties and fears that drive our 
competitive actions. But once again, communication and social interaction take 
time and are often considered inefficient in the modern western culture. 
However, what is an efficient society? Do we have an efficient society when the 
average citizen works so much that he or she cannot spend quality time with 
friends and family? Is society efficient when parents work so much that their 
children do not get the attention they need to feel loved and secure? Is society 
efficient when people are both mentally and physically worn out before they 
retire? Is society efficient when competition for status destroys the social bonds 
                                                 
33 Erich Fromm describes this in Escape from Freedom (1982). He claims that the 
primary motivator in our society is fear – that we, for example, don’t dare to break 
the negative spiral of material comparison.  
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that hold communities together?34 These are questions that determine what is 
considered rational in society and are therefore important to the deliberative 
process but also to the creation of social capital. Cultivating citizens to gain 
advantages rather than to cooperate, to separate rather than connect, and to 
persuade without seeking understanding is, from that perspective, questionable. 
 
Concluding Discussion 
Who are we? Where are we going? These are fundamental questions that 
cannot be answered individually or through simple public opinion polls. Our 
communal identity and our communal destination can only be defined 
communally. That is, democracy, which is a communal and not an individual 
process, requires that we deal with these kinds of issues together – that we reach 
common understanding and reason through communication. This essay has 
examined how the modern western perspective of time often stands in conflict 
with democratic practices based on inclusive and egalitarian social interaction.      
The most obvious temporal aspects relate to a perceived scarcity of time. The 
2000 presidential election, when we barely had time to vote and count all votes, 
exemplified this problem. However, counting (and re-counting) close to 100 
                                                 
34 Many American politicians, especially to the right, took notice of a Swedish 
survey showing that more than 50 percent of all Swedes thought that it was okay 
to stay home from work for a day when they were feeling a little burned out and 
tired. That kind of attitude does not appear rational in a society where work is 




million votes may take weeks, but that is a relatively short timeframe compared to 
the aggregated amount time it would take to have the American public finding 
ways to interact more in order to find the common understanding necessary to 
reach communal answers to the questions of who we are and where we are going.  
A common objection to the vision of a democracy based on rational 
deliberation and inclusive social interaction is that it is impossible to implement 
and that most people simply do not function (or have time to function) in that way. 
The high turnout in the 2004 presidential election was, for example, driven by 
strong feelings – pro and con – about the incumbent candidate George W. Bush 
and his policies35.  Bush supporters liked his presidential leadership as well as his 
likeability and sense of humor while specific policy references were secondary in 
their decision to vote for him (CNN exit polls, 2004). This is typical of a society 
obsessed with time and honor. That is, it is a society where there is no time to 
deliberate, privately or publicly, where the focus of all debates is winning and 
honor, where the average sound-bite in TV news programs is less then 10 seconds; 
and where many Americans receive a large amount of their political information 
from short TV-ads. It is representative of a society in which the temporal anxiety 
is affecting all attitudes and behavior. The one and only thing that the voter is left 
with in this “time-efficient” environment is his or her emotions. The time it takes 
to figure out how you feel about a candidate is much shorter than the time it takes 
to figure out how social security needs to be adjusted to avoid bankruptcy. The 
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time it takes to figure out whether a candidate is the winner or looser in a 
Presidential debate is much shorter than the time it takes to figure out whether 
America need to “twist the arm” of Israel’s Prime Minister in order to increase the 
chances of a peace in the Middle-East. Emotions, including perceptions of honor, 
are time-efficient; they allow us to move on with our lives without having to get 
involved in the time-consuming business of deliberation.  
There are still instances where the scarcity of time is legitimate. The Battle of 
Marathon (490 BC), in which the Athenians “saved” the Western civilization, is 
an example of legitimate temporal concerns. The Athenians asked the Spartans for 
help fighting the Persians who were only a marathon (26 miles) away from the 
city of Athens. The Spartans claimed that they had to wait until after the full moon 
before going to battle (a few days later), which potentially could have been after 
Athens already were in the in the hands of the Persians. Time, in that context, 
really mattered: there was no time to wait. 
However, it is harder to accept the Supreme Court’s decision in 2000 to not 
count all the votes in the election due to the lack of time. What would have 
happened if all the inauguration ceremonies had to wait a week or two? My guess 
is nothing. I doubt that any other country would try to invade the U.S. because the 
inauguration did not take place on a specific date. I doubt that the economic 
activity in the U.S. suddenly would stop because the vote-counting process took a 
little bit longer than first planned. The Supreme Court made a reference to specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
TP
35 According to exit-polling presented at www.fairvote.org  
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dates that they treated as natural and therefore absolute. The inauguration had to 
take place on a certain date – anything else would be a violation of absolute 
standards. The specific context of this election did not matter – it was more 
important to honor old artificial standards dictating a specific time-schedule than 
to honor a commitment to democracy and count all the votes.  
Yet the question we have to ask ourselves is whether we simply should 
surrender to the “human short-coming” of constantly chasing time. Should we 
settle with a political system and culture that effectively violates an egalitarian 
vision of democracy? Also, should it not matter that our communal decisions 
could be of low quality simply because we do not have time to deliberate about 
the issues but instead allow the decisions to be based on emotional considerations, 
traditions, and exclusive private interests? It may be true that things cannot be 
perfect, but perfect is not the same as better. Could we not at least aim for a 
society where everybody participates in the fundamental process of constructing 
meaning and reason?  
Temporal aspects are important to the above questions and especially to the 
notion that our modern western relationship to time (and status) is “natural” – that 
we simply have to accept the notion that things have to happen fast or it is 
“inefficient. However, what is efficient from one perspective may not be efficient 
from another. This is an issue not only limited to the political process, but also to 
all aspects of social interaction.  
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Most medical patients, for example, are treated with drugs – the interaction 
between caregivers and patients is generally limited to the communication 
necessary to prescribe certain drugs. Even people suffering from mental diseases 
are prescribed drugs as the general treatment. Drugs may be expensive to purchase 
but they are more “efficient” then paying someone to sit down and talk to a patient 
for hours since salaries generally cost more than drugs. But are we really treating 
the mental problems with the drugs? Isn’t it possible that the drugs cause other 
problems that cannot be measured in financial terms? That is, is it really possible 
to measure communicative needs financially?  
A lot of people pay enormous amounts of money to be connected with someone 
else. Initial dating is something that traditionally took place in the social 
interaction of everyday life. People used to pay their bills directly to a teller – now 
they often pay their bills on a computer in their own private setting. People used to 
work with other people whether it was inside a factory or in an office – now they 
work with a robot, a computer or even at home. People used to watch football 
games in the middle of the stadium crowd – nowadays they often watch the game 
at home, from a skybox, or from an exclusive seat in the stadium. People used to 
eat inside the fast-food place – nowadays they use the drive-thru and eat at home. 
There are many examples of situations now disappearing in the name of 
“efficiency” that used to be opportunities to meet other people that potentially 
could develop into a serious relationship. 
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The other side of this issue is that the “natural” settings for social interaction 
are disappearing and people are paying large amounts of money just to find 
someone to socially interact with. A potential result of this is that the 
communication is getting more formalized. We don’t interact “naturally” anymore 
but rather plan exactly how we are supposed to interact and what we should say in 
those instances when we are set up with other people in an organized way. That is, 
formalized and organized forms of communication focus on who we are trying to 
be (strategically) rather than naturally exposing who we really are. This is hardly 
increasing our ability to understand each other and find common meaning. Our 
ability to interact and work with other people (especially those we don’t directly 
chose to interact with) decreases due to less opportunities to practice social 
interaction, and decreasing social interaction skills could develop into decreasing 
willingness to interact. It is not hard to see how we eventually could end up in a 
negative spiral. 
The foundation of society: relationships, neighborhood cooperation, and 
educational processes, are all important aspects of the modern society that depend 
on our ability to reach common understanding and common meaning through 
social interaction. All the separate individual aspects of an “efficient” society 
connect somewhere: the trees create a forest if one looks wide enough. An 
efficient society has to be more than the sum of separate individual cases.    
A change in our perception of time and especially how time and financial 
aspects connect in our perception of efficiency is therefore important not only for 
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democratic purposes but also for the well-being of our entire society. Both 
societies and democracies are communal entities that must be upheld through 
communal action – they can never be reduced to independent individual actions. 
That means that not everything has to be more rational merely to produce the most 
amount of money or privacy in the shortest possible time.  
A good starting point for that kind of temporal paradigm shift is what Jeremy 
Rifkin refers to as a democratization of time: a society where time is a communal 
rather than an individual possession.     
In an empathetic political order, the most inalienable of all rights is the right 
to share equally in time. Everyone has a right of equal access to both past and 
future. In an empathetic time world, planning the future is a communal 
venture and memorizing the past a shared undertaking. There is no thought of 
possessing time, much less of manipulating the time of others to secure an 
advantage over the future. Robbing people of their past and future is an 
unthinkable crime in a social order where empathy is the ruling paradigm.  
The democratization of time becomes the overriding priority in a society 
where empathy substitutes for power. Temporal pyramids are eschewed and 
hierarchical schedules and programs are replaced with shared-time tasks as 
people come to view time as a collective experience rather than a tool to 
exercise power over others. (Rifkin, 1997, p. 196)  
 
Limitations and Implications 
One of the most obvious temporal limitations to a theoretical study is finding a 
"natural" ending to the study. There are always more perspectives in the next line 
of literature that could put the general argument in a different light or even change 
the conclusion. The problems related to selecting the literature as discussed early 
on obviously relates to this issue: there may be plenty of literature that are not 
mentioned in the general academic dialogue that would allow for slightly different 
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conclusions. The issues of social bonds and time are broad and have been 
discussed in a vast amount of literature at least since the days of Plato and 
Aristotle, which speaks to the possibility of adding an enormous amount of 
literature to this kind of study.  
The general theoretical discussed in this dissertation is hard to test in a 
traditional empirical way. Claibourne and Martin (2000) tried to test how 
increasing organizational activity affects individual attitudes and received no 
support for any positive effects. However, the common reason that develops in 
social interaction does not appear on an individual basis - it exists in the relations 
between citizens. Each individual citizen does not necessary know more or think 
differently just because they decide to take part in a social activity – it is the 
connection between the citizens that changes. The general social scientific 
paradigm focuses on the individual and adds them up to a mass through 
quantifiable methods. This generally means that the bonds between the citizens 
are ignored; we receive data on an aggregated mass of individuals rather than on 
the actual group. Gebser (1985) claims that this does not mean that our society is 
inherently individualistic (rather than collectivistic). There is a collective mass but 
that mass is made up of unconnected individuals who make the aperspectival 
modern world both individualistic and collectivistic. The collective mass is a 
function of individualism.    
The changes in the bonds between the citizens also do not happen in a week, a 
month, or a year. Our ability to connect, reach intersubjective understanding, and 
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eventually find common reason develops over a long period of time. Robert 
Putnam (1993), for example, traces the differences in social capital between 
Northern and Southern Italy in many hundreds of year back in time. It is therefore 
hard to study these changes in regular experiments where we measure effects 
among individuals in a relatively short period of time. The temporal anxiety 
makes us look for instant gratification – we want to be able to instantly report 
quantifiable evidence supporting our theories. However, social bonds does not 
change in an experiment that lasts a week or even one year, which effectively 
means that the results we are looking for do not give us gratification next month 
but rather in twenty years or even more.   
There are still plenty of opportunities to further study different aspects of 
democratic social interaction, communication, and deliberation. Philosophers like 
Cohen and Estlund, sociologists like Coleman, and political scientists like Putnam 
have all put communication and social interaction between citizens in center of 
democracy. Communication scholars like Deetz and Ryfe have also studied the 
democratic aspects of communication but I believe that the field of 
communication could offer much more to this topic. Plenty of communication 
scholars, headed by Robert Denton, Lynda Kaid and Kathleen Jamieson, have 
studied the strategic aspects of political communication: what politicians do to 
make citizens vote for them (or in some cases not vote for the opponent). 
However, I believe that there are plenty of communication scholars with great 
experience from studying the communication taking place in for example 
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organizations, between medical doctors and patients, between family members, in 
educational settings and even between members with different cultural 
backgrounds that could bring interesting knowledge and perspectives to the 
democratic aspects of the daily interaction in society. That would in many cases 
require switching the focus from the traditional strategic aspects of 
communication (how I persuade others to do what I want) to the more 
communicative aspects of communicating (to communally discover good reason). 
It would also require that we study the connections between the citizens rather 
than the attitudes of each individual citizen. Ultimately, we have to recognize that 
democracy does not only take place in the formal settings that political scientists 
traditionally study. Democracy in the modern western mass society also takes 
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